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THE REACTION AGAINST WILLIAM GODWIN

I

In 1801 William Godwin published his *Thoughts Occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon*, a pamphlet in which, with dignity and praiseworthy restraint of feeling, he undertook to reply to the numerous vehement and more or less vituperative critics, who, repelled and, in some cases, panic-stricken by his doctrines of rationalistic anarchism, had been attacking his *Political Justice* in lectures, sermons, novels, and pamphlets.¹ Preparatory to his consideration of the charges of his opponents, Godwin reviews the various phases of the reaction against him. He emphasizes the fact that upon its publication in 1793 *Political Justice* had immediately gained him such credit with people of literary and intellectual distinction that for more than four years he had listened only to the "voice of commendation."² But he goes on to explain that after the excesses in France had started a violent reaction against those principles of the Revolution which were held responsible for the crimes committed to the cry "Liberty and fraternity," many of his friends had gradually

¹ Of the spirit which pervades five of the best pages in Godwin's reply, Coleridge says in a marginal comment in his copy of the pamphlet in the British Museum: "They reflect great honor on Godwin's head and heart. Tho' I did it only in the zenith of his reputation, yet I feel remorse ever to have spoken unkindly of such a man."

² Hazlitt's statement is often quoted: "No work gave in our time such a blow to the philosophical mind of our country." An unknown author testifies: "In many places, perhaps some hundreds, in England and Scotland copies were bought by subscription, and read aloud in meetings of the subscribers" (*Public Characters*, London, 1799).

deserted the cause of freedom, and he, alone having remained faithful, had found himself the object of criticism, at first respectful and judicial, and later by degrees more bitterly hostile and insulting. With the attitude of two pamphlets and Malthus' *Essay upon Population*, which had appeared in 1798, Godwin has no fault to find. But he expresses keen resentment that in 1799 his former friend Sir James Mackintosh, in his public lectures upon *The Law of Nature and Nations*, had treated him "like a highwayman or an assassin," and represented him "as a wretch, who only wanted the power in order to prove himself as infernal as Robespierre." Godwin then records that the next year after Mackintosh's attack two new critics had appeared against him. Rev. Robert Hall, the distinguished Baptist divine, had warned his flock against the pernicious radicalism of the day in a famous sermon upon "Modern Infidelity" in which, in Godwin's opinion, "every notion of toleration or decorum was treated with infuriated contempt."¹ Then, in April of the same year, another of Godwin's friends, Dr. Samuel Parr, had felt himself under obligation, in a sermon before the Lord Mayor of London himself, to attempt to demolish, as perilous to the moral order, the doctrine of universal benevolence, a cornerstone of *Political Justice*. Godwin brushes aside with contempt the insults of other critics—"the vulgar contumelies of the author of the *Pursuits of Literature*, novels of buffoonery and scandal to the amount of half a score, and British critics, Anti-Jacobin newspapers, and Anti-Jacobin magazines without number."²

Godwin's account of the reaction against him is illuminating as far as it goes, but it can scarcely be regarded as complete. It is

¹ In his younger days Robert Hall, like so many others, was an ardent supporter of the cause of liberty, but after the atrocities of the Revolution he recoiled from its doctrines. This change of attitude is disclosed by a comparison of *An Apology for the Freedom of the Press* (1793), in which he took issue with Burke and extolled the rights of man, and his sermon, "Modern Infidelity." This latter address, first made in Bristol in October (1800), and repeated in Cambridge in November, created a deep impression; it attracted to the dissenting meeting-house as regular hearers both students and fellows. Mackintosh in his lectures at Lincoln's Inn, and Dr. Parr in his notes to his "Spital Sermon," quoted it with approval, and subsequently it went through many editions. In 1803 Hall returned to his attack upon Godwin in his sermon, "The Sentiments Proper to the Present Crisis." See Vol. I of *Works*, 3 vols., New York, 1832.

² Two pamphlets not mentioned by title in the discussion above are: W. C. Proby, *Modern Philosophy and Barbarism, or a Comparison between the Theory of Godwin and the Practice of Lycurgus*, London, 1798; and Thomas Green, *An Examination of the Leading Principles of the New System of Morals, as that Principle is Stated and Applied*

deficient in two respects. In the first place, Godwin in his analysis does not put his finger on all the causes of the hostility of which he was the victim. In the second place, he is apparently ignorant of the fact that the reaction against him had begun earlier than he indicates. It is the purpose of the first part of this paper to supply this missing information in preparation for a full discussion in the second part of the fiction written in criticism of his radicalism.

Godwin is undoubtedly correct in explaining the reaction of public opinion against him by the growing antagonism to the whole revolutionary movement felt among conservatives and those liberals who had been shocked by the course of events in France. Yet it is possible to recognize in addition more specific and personal reasons why the hostility to Godwin gradually grew more bitter. Probably he shared in the odium which the more zealous of his disciples incurred by the active promulgation of his views. John Thelwall, possessed of an ardor for propaganda of which Godwin himself repeatedly disapproved, in defiance of government opposition persisted in public lectures to disseminate revolutionary doctrine, until finally in 1795, after the government had failed to convict him of treason in 1794, he was muzzled by the Pitt and Grenville Bill against Sedition.¹ In 1796, at one of the meetings of the Royston bookclub, when the subject of discussion was the problem whether private affection was compatible with universal benevolence, Crabb Robinson defended the Godwinian point of view so warmly that two years later, when he visited Bury, he discovered that he was in ill repute, and that Rev. Robert Hall had strenuously remonstrated with a member of his church whose intention had been to entertain Robinson.² The result of this incident was an energetic exchange of letters between Robinson

in *Mr. Godwin's Political Justice, in a Letter to a Friend*, 1798 (2d ed., 1799). Here might be cited also two works by an anti-Godwinian, Robert Fellowes: *Religion without Cant: or, a Preservative against Lukewarmness and Intolerance*, London, 1801 (see pp. 307 ff., 328 ff., 392); and *A Picture of Christian Philosophy. The Fourth Edition. With a Supplement on the Culture and Practice of Benevolence*, London, 1803 (see pp. 75 ff., 297 ff.).

¹ For Thelwall's indebtedness to Godwin see, for example, the two lectures on the *Prospective Principles of Virtue*, Vol. I of *The Tribune, a Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall*, 3 vols., London, 1795-96. For his personal relations with Godwin see Charles Cestre, *John Thelwall*, London and New York, 1906.

² Crabb-Robinson, *Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence*, selected and edited by Thomas Sadler (2 vols., 3d ed., London and New York, 1872), I, 21.

and Hall—a correspondence which reveals the increasing alarm with which the propagation of the ideas of *Political Justice* was viewed.

Those of Godwin's disciples who revealed in one way or another any sympathy with his denunciation of marriage in favor of greater freedom in the relationship of the sexes, were especially responsible in no small degree for the popular hatred of the author of *Political Justice*. In 1796 Mary Hays, who had long been the friend and admirer of Mary Wollstonecraft, and whose reputation had, as Crabb Robinson informs us, unjustly suffered on that account, published the *Memoirs of Emma Courtney*.¹ In this novel the heroine, taking her cue from *The Rights of Woman*, deplores as a tragedy the economic dependence of her sex, and, fortified by the individualistic doctrines of *Political Justice*, upholds the right of private judgment, offers herself as mistress to the man she passionately loves, and in general suffers cruelly in her continual clashes with the conventions of a "distempered civilization." Such being the rebellious spirit of the novel, it was inevitable that in the public mind what appeared as the iniquities of Godwin and Mary Hays became associated, and that subsequent novels, designed to expose Godwinian sophistry, quoted from both *Political Justice* and *Emma Courtney*.²

After the death of his wife Godwin, by his publication of *The Wrongs of Woman* among the posthumous works of Mary Wollstonecraft and by the *Memoirs* in 1798, made a conscientious attempt to do her honor, but in each case his efforts were misdirected, and, ironically enough, succeeded only in intensifying the animosity against himself and in bringing Mary Wollstonecraft into greater disrepute with sternly "respectable" people. *The Wrongs of Woman* made it clear that association with him had deepened her radicalism, and that, more defiant and uncompromising in her attitude toward society than she had been in her earlier work, Mary Wollstonecraft was inclined to sympathize with his attack upon marriage. As a protest against economic conditions that permitted to women so few honorable employments and made prostitution an almost inevitable alternative, as a plea for more liberal divorce laws by which a woman

¹ See also for the influence of Mary Wollstonecraft upon Miss Hays the latter's *Letters and Essays, Moral and Miscellaneous*, London, 1793.

² For example, Charles Lloyd, *Edmund Oliver*, 2 vols., Bristol, 1798; Elizabeth Hamilton, *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers*, 3 vols., 1800.

might more easily free herself from a drunkard or a rake, and as a defense of the wife who, revolted by the degrading misery of life with a dissipated husband, deserts him to enter a union with a man who intellectually and morally is her equal, this vivid naturalistic novel seemed to aim a blow at the very foundations of morality. The success the same year of such a play as Kotzebue's *The Stranger*, in which an erring wife is forgiven by her husband, indicated to the popular mind a dangerous and growing sympathy with the adulteress. Ladies of impeccable propriety, like Miss Hannah More and Mrs. Jane West, indignant at such leniency and armed with the terrors of Christian charity as they interpreted it, issued warnings against the insidious connivance at viciousness, and made known what sentence they thought ought to be passed upon the outcast and the unfaithful wife.¹

Moreover, as we have said, Godwin's well-intentioned biography of Mary Wollstonecraft, in which matters were given publicity that would otherwise have remained unknown, provided the unfeeling, blundering enemy with additional weapons of attack. Whereas *Caleb Williams* (1794) had impressed the public largely by virtue of its thrilling narrative, and *The Enquirer* had been received indifferently as a less vigorous statement of some of the doctrines of *Political Justice*, the *Memoirs*, with its frank, unapologetic account of Mary Wollstonecraft's relations with Imlay and Godwin, seemed an affront to decency, affording convincing proof that by ingenious sophistry the new philosophers would sanction unbridled licentiousness. In the second edition in the same year poor Godwin attempted to tone down such passages as were likely to offend the moral sensibilities of his readers, but his effort at reparation was too late. In his novel, *The Infernal Quixote*, Charles Lucas describes with sarcastic comment Godwin's *Memoirs* as the "History of the Intrigues of His Own Wife."² Outraged that the philosopher should have felt himself

¹ Hannah More, *Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education* (2 vols., 3d ed., London, 1799), I, 47, 48, 145; Mrs. Jane West, *Letters Addressed to a Young Man* (3 vols., London, 1801), II, 221, 225. See also the *Monthly Review*, June, 1798. The critic prefers A. Schink's version of *The Stranger*, in which the wife considers elopement, but does not actually sin. This change the translator regarded as "more consistent with moral sentiment, and more congenial to the heart of an English audience." Unfortunately for the preservation of English morality, this sanitary version was never played (see Genest).

² *The Infernal Quixote* (4 vols., London, 1801), I, 170.

under obligation to apologize for his indulgence in marriage, an institution of which he had made previously such unsparing criticism, Rev. Robert Hall branded Godwin's book as "a narrative of his licentious amours."¹ When former admirers of Mary Wollstonecraft read of "the errors which love should have concealed," "the idol they had worshipped" became "an image of clay."² Thus Godwin's effort to vindicate Mary Wollstonecraft was persistently misconstrued, and an insidious significance was seen in the fact that the authoress of such a book of passionate protest as *The Wrongs of Woman* had loved out of wedlock. Generally with little justice and sometimes with even less decency the cry was taken up by various writers and echoed in review, treatise, novel, and satiric poem.³

It has been shown, I think, in what respects Godwin's analysis of the causes of the reaction against him is incomplete. The chronology of his account is also not entirely satisfactory. Godwin is scarcely accurate when he asserts that "for more than four years," that is, until about 1798, *Political Justice* remained without the slightest refutation. Although he had met Coleridge at the close of 1794, perhaps he did not know that in the Bristol lectures in 1795 and in *The Watchman* in 1796 the young poet had attacked the principles of *Political Justice*. During the same period, while he was at Race-down, Dorsetshire, Wordsworth, who had for a long time been plunged into pessimism at the failure of the Godwinian philosophy, under the test of experience, to clarify his spiritual problems and to vindicate reason as an infallible guide, emerged from his doubt and self-analysis and wrote *The Borderers* as a record of his emancipation from the seducing formulas of Godwinian optimism. As far as I

¹ "Modern Infidelity," in Vol. I of *Works*, 3 vols, New York, 1832.

² Mary Wollstonecraft's biography in Vol. II of Mrs. Elwood's *Memoirs of the Literary Ladies of England*, 2 vols., London, 1843.

³ John Bowles, *Reflections on the Political and Moral State of Society at the Close of the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1800), p. 134; *The Millennium, a Poem in Three Cantos* (London, 1800), I, II, 423-40; *The Anti-Jacobin Review*, June, 1803. As late as 1817 a scurrilous book, *The Sexagenarian; or The Recollections of a Literary Life* (2 vols., London), describes (Vol. I, chap. III) in these atrocious terms Mary Wollstonecraft's attempted suicide after Imlay's desertion: "The lady did not indeed, in imitation of Sappho, precipitate herself from another Leucadian rock; she chose a more vulgar mode of death; she put some lead into her pockets, and threw herself into the water. She did not, however, use lead enough, as there was still gas sufficient left in her head to counterpoise it. She was rescued from the watery bier, and lived again to experience the feverish varieties of the tender passion."

have been able to discover, in the considerable body of anti-Godwinian literature, *The Borderers* is the only work that has dramatic form, and Wordsworth seems to have been the first to adopt the plan of exposing the dangers of Godwinism by means of a fiction exhibiting the disastrous results of carrying the principles of *Political Justice* into practice. With *The Borderers* itself Godwin may not have been acquainted, as Wordsworth did not publish it until 1842. In 1797, as we shall see, the *Letters of a Hindoo Rajah* hilariously burlesqued cherished Godwinian ideas, and the *Anti-Jacobin* (December 18) heaped ridicule upon his conception of gratitude and marriage. These efforts, however, Godwin may not have regarded as rising to the dignity of a refutation.

The facts point to the conclusion that from 1795 the attacks upon Godwin grew more frequent and more bitter, precipitated, as they were, partly by the general reaction against the spirit of the French Revolution and partly by the excessive zeal of his disciples and the unguarded frankness of his *Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft*. In 1798, the year of the publication of *The Wrongs of Woman* and the *Memoirs*, there was a sudden increase of hostility, two anti-Godwinian novels and three anti-Godwinian pamphlets making their appearance. In 1799 and 1800 the antagonism was scarcely less bitter. In 1801, in his reply to Dr. Parr's "Spital Sermon," Godwin declared: "The cry spread like a general infection, and I have been told that not even a petty novel . . . now ventures to aspire to favour, unless it contains some expression of dislike and abhorrence to the new philosophy, and its chief (or shall I say its most voluminous?) English adherent."

II

To an account of these anti-Godwinian novels, an almost forgotten page in the history of our fiction, I wish to give attention in the rest of this paper. Few of these novels are mentioned in the current manuals, yet their number—and further search would probably reveal more of them stowed away in old libraries—indicates how great was thought to be the necessity of putting out of court such revolutionary doctrines as Godwin had formulated. Obviously it is only by the accumulation of such evidence that we can interpret

justly the spirit of the age and estimate the solidarity of conservative opinion. It is noteworthy that the best of these books were rapidly disposed of, *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers* (1800) by Elizabeth Hamilton and *The Vagabond* (1799) by George Walker going through three editions within three years. In the Preface of the third edition of his work Walker, who had appropriately dedicated his book to the reactionary Lord Bishop of Llandaff, expresses the hope that the rapid sale of his anti-Godwinian novel is proof that the aristocratic classes are awakening to a sense of duty, and are encouraging by the purchase of their books the authors who write in defense of the established order. It is a shame, in Walker's opinion, that Tom Paine should have made a fortune from his inflammatory treatises. The amount of anti-Godwinian material in these different novels varies. Sometimes, as in the anonymous *Memoirs of M. de Brinboc* (1805), it is very slight indeed, introduced, one suspects, largely because it was the fashion in some quarters to bespatter the modern philosophers; more frequently it forms the very substance of the work. The mood of these novels varies also, ranging from burlesque, as in the anonymous *St. Godwin* (1800), to tragedy, as in Charles Lloyd's *Edmund Oliver* (1798) and Mrs. Opie's *Adeline Mowbray* (1804).

Their bitterly uncompromising attitude toward the doctrines of *Political Justice* is reflected by the novelists in their characterization of Godwinians. Sometimes the philosopher is represented as a well-intentioned man imposed upon by a doctrine of specious philanthropy and conscientiously undertaking to disseminate his radical ideas. Such are Lok in *Waldorf*, Glenmurray in *Adeline Mowbray*, and Arnon in *The Infernal Quixote*, all of whom come to regret bitterly the havoc they have wrought. More often the novelist represents the philosopher as a cold-blooded, calculating villain, who finds in lawless Godwinian individualism a theory of life thoroughly congenial to his unprincipled nature, and who deliberately employs the insinuating doctrines of *Political Justice* to destroy the moral scruples of his victims in order to accomplish his own vile designs. This character is a resuscitation of the Machiavellian villain of Elizabethan tragedy, the triumphant egoist, proud of his intellectual powers, contemptuous of his victims, and doing evil systematically.

Such a type is of frequent recurrence in revolutionary literature, especially in Germany, but Wordsworth is probably the first to represent the type as a propagator of Godwinism. Like Oswald, in Wordsworth's *The Borderers*, ruthlessly destroying all the finer sentiments that ennoble humanity, are Fitzosborne in Mrs. West's *A Tale of the Times* (1799), Vallaton in *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers*, Marauder in *The Infernal Quixote*, Williams in the anonymous novel *Dorothea, or A Ray of the New Light* (1801), and Denham in the anonymous *The Citizen's Daughter* (1804). Stupeo, the Pangloss of *The Vagabond*, instructs his pupil, "When we [i.e., the philosophers] have shaken off the influence of everything called principle, are satisfied we have no portion of eternity, and that the fable of an avenging Deity is an old woman's tale, what power, I ask, can control us? We become almost too great for the world, mind seems to rise superior to matter, crime becomes nothing; all that men call murder, incest, lust, and cruelty, are trifling." . . . "I feel," cries Frederick, "I feel I am now free. I shall render my name immortal, for no human tie, no moral check shall stay the purpose of my power."¹

When the novelists undertake to exhibit the Godwinian system in operation in actual life, they represent it, according as their mood is satiric or serious, as responsible for the most ludicrous situations or utter misery. Space forbidding the discussion of all the ideas the sophistry of which is thus exposed, we can give our attention to the treatment of only the most significant of these conceptions.

Fundamental in the structure of *Political Justice* is the idea, derived from Helvetius, that man is the product of his education, that is, the sum total of all the influences that play upon him from the very moment of birth. This theory of environment, responsible for much of Godwin's antagonism to any form of government as one of the most evil and most powerful of the forces molding human character, was burlesqued with Aristophanic extravagance by Elizabeth Hamilton. Bridgetina Botherim, a squint-eyed Godwinian, explains that she imbibed a "love of literature and an importunate sensibility" from the milk of her foster-nurse, a village girl who at

¹ Vol. II, chap. iv. Walker's attacks upon Godwin occurred after he had slavishly copied the plot of *Caleb Williams* in his own novel *Theodore Cyphon* (1796). Certainly a Godwinian conception of gratitude! With Stupeo's credo compare that of Marauder in *The Infernal Quixote*, II, 297, 298.

the time was being taught to read by the parish clerk in Muddy Lane. In the "fifth grand era" of her life she acquired her passion for metaphysics.

My mother got a packet of brown snuff from London by the mail-coach; it was wrapped in two proof-sheets of the quarto-edition of the Political Justice. I eagerly snatched up the paper, and notwithstanding the frequent fits of sneezing it occasioned, from the quantity of snuff contained in every fold, I greedily devoured its contents. I read and sneezed, and sneezed and read, till the germ of philosophy began to fructify my soul. From that moment I became a philosopher and need not inform you of the important consequences.¹

In *Letters of a Hindoo Rajah*, also by Elizabeth Hamilton, Mr. Sceptic raises his fellow-philosophers to a high pitch of excitement by expressing his conviction that, by altering their environment, sparrows might be changed to honeybees. As Miss Ardent remarks, "According to the arguments of the young philosopher, I see no reason why, by a proper course of education, a monkey may not be a Minister of State, or a goose Lord Chancellor of England." The philosophers enthusiastically determine to put Mr. Sceptic's theory to immediate trial. They catch three hundred sparrows, build a huge hive, and put the birds therein. At dawn Sir Caprice hastens to the hive in his night robe to find out if the sparrows have begun to hum. Hark! he hears a buzz. He listens. No! It is a solitary bee in a shrub near by. When the philosophers discover that the sparrows have flown away, they conclude that the birds have swarmed on some neighboring tree and may be fixed in their abode by a beating of pans. Hope is rekindled. The next morning, undaunted by a pouring rain, the philosophers sally forth with tin pans and beat them violently beneath a tree on which they have spied a few sparrows. But the birds are obdurate and refuse to swarm. "The master of the bees declared he had never seen a swarm so unman-ageable."²

We should not, however, allow such a satire, excellent as it is, to blind us to the fact that it was just such impregnable optimism that inspired much of the social idealism of the revolutionary era and encouraged faith in human regeneration. Men of common sense who

¹ *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers* (3d ed., 1801), II, 83 ff.

² II, 158 ff.

had read their Rousseau and Helvetius tried to carry these theories into practice. Thomas Day, Richard Edgeworth, and John Thelwall experimented with the education of children. So sincerely did Crabb Robinson and Bentham admire Helvetius that, as young men, they thought of entering his service as servants.¹

Godwin's confidence that the individual might, without danger to either himself or society, dispense with the restraint of law or government was grounded in the conviction that man was fundamentally a rational being, and that in every situation in life he might rely upon his private judgment to supply the place of general principles in the determination of what was just. This philosophy, in a savage but penetrating piece of analysis, Lucas stigmatizes as a species of diabolism because of its affinity with the spirit of Satan. "So these Worthies, who carry every law, divine and human, within their own breasts, can never be guilty of any crime; for, whatever their conduct is, they can justify it to themselves; they never act without a reason, and that reason is law."² This creed dominates the actions of Godwinian villains so that, after a moment of introspection, they always see in the inclinations of egoism merely the dictates of an infallible understanding. Covetous of Amelia, who is beloved by his dearest friend, Frederick is able to find adequate Godwinian grounds for undertaking her seduction.³ With his eye on Lord Monteith's estates, Fitzosborne argues to the conclusion that he himself, "an active, intelligent, enterprising citizen," should possess the property rather than "an indolent sensualist."⁴ This creed, too, is the means by which schemers like Fitzosborne and Marauder corrupt their deluded victims, silencing by ingenious sophistry the instinctive protests of their moral nature and encouraging a defiant independence of all the prohibitions of traditional ethics. Striving to blunt Waldorf's conscience, Lok, like another Wordsworthian Oswald, argues cunningly: "Your judgment can never be wrong. Reason is never erroneous, but *false* sentiment may be your destruction. You are influenced by a set of chimerical notions of probity and honor; but this is the effect of romance; you will soon discriminate

¹ Robinson's *Diary*, I, 195.

² *The Infernal Quizote*, II, 268; III, 182.

³ *The Vagabond*, Vol. I, chap. iii.

⁴ *A Tale of the Times*, II, 294.

better and think differently."¹ Waldorf proves an apt pupil; determined to be "no automaton, agitated by springs to act by the directions of others," he rises superior to public opinion and accomplishes the ruin of three innocent women. Indeed, all of these rampant individualists are sensitive lest someone trespass upon the right of private judgment. Dorothea Melville, educated by a governess who is a disciple of the New Philosophy, at sixteen years of age repudiates her control as a form of despotism. Stupeo doubts "whether the very article of our birth be not a great breach of political justice, since our consent was not required."²

To no other principle of his philosophy do Godwin's opponents give more attention than to his doctrine of universal benevolence. What excited the repugnance of Godwin's contemporaries was the fact that his philosophy, while apparently directing human activity to a noble goal of unselfish achievement, in reality confused ethical values and tended to brutalize character and to encourage relentless egoism. As a rigid utilitarian Godwin laid it down as a fundamental principle that according to the requirements of absolute justice in every action of his life the individual should regulate his conduct with a view to producing the greatest good to the greatest number, and accordingly, if it is necessary in order to realize this ideal, he must proscribe all those immediate incentives to action—gratitude, friendship, domestic affection, and patriotism—which traditional moralists have insistently eulogized, but which, in fact, selfishly attach us to our associates and create a preference detrimental to the interest of humanity. From this slaughter of our most cherished feelings in the name of universal benevolence Godwin's contemporaries recoiled. They recognized that, not being omniscient, and consequently being unable to determine the ultimate effects of a proposed action, the conscientious man would contemplate helplessly innumerable possible modes of conduct; his duties as husband, father, and citizen would be obscured; in the interval his power of action would be paralyzed; and energies that might have been fruitful of much good would be wasted in futile, blundering calculations. They recognized that by means of this philosophy the wicked man would be able to justify

¹ Waldorf, I, 74.

The Vagabond, Vol. I, chap. II.

the most egoistic impulses and under the guise of general utility prey upon society and commit the most heinous offenses. Evil is bad enough under any circumstances, but it is infinitely worse when it masquerades as virtue. We are assured by one good clergyman that "the unholy speculations of Mr. Godwin were founded entirely upon this basis." Indeed, in defiance of truth and justice, the terrified moralists altogether too often bring the accusation that the new doctrines are adopted largely by those who wish to use them as a shield for crimes or vice.¹ Both the pamphleteers and the novelists show that the boasted reason is miserably unequal to the high tasks Godwin would impose upon it. They make it clear that reason is deficient in power to comprehend life in all its infinite variety and complexity and thereby to choose, on the basis of an unerring vision of the ultimate consequences of alternative courses of conduct, that course more conducive to the general good. They reveal the painful truth that in the absence of general principles the reason is incapable of a cool, detached analysis and judgment of facts, is swayed by the feelings, and for the most part becomes the base servitor of self-interest. They point to the danger that, in the flattering belief that the universe is the only suitable field for the activity of his benevolent impulses, the individual will scornfully neglect the numerous opportunities afforded by social intercourse for doing immediate and actual good within his capacity, and consequently life will be gradually stripped of the consolations conferred by gratitude, affection, and compassion.

In *Edmund Oliver* (1798), the novel after which Mme de Genlis, wishing to refute the Encyclopedists, modeled her *La Femme philosophe* (1800), Charles Lloyd, Coleridge's friend, arraigns the philosophy of reason and philanthropy. The heroine, Gertrude Sinclair, has dispensed with marriage and accepted D'Oyley as her lover. When Edmund appears and demands the fulfilment of her former promise to him, Gertrude, imagining herself completely emancipated from conventional scruples, attempts to argue away the obligation as a fetter of the mind, but in the conflict between her feelings and her "omnipotent reason" she suffers bitterly, and finally, when D'Oyley abandons her, her philosophy utterly fails her and she

¹ See Robert Hall, Findlater, Hannah More, and John Bowles.

is plunged into moral chaos. Obviously this is similar to the spiritual tragedy of the Wordsworthian Marmaduke, occasioned in this case, however, by different circumstances. In a satiric vein Walker has exhibited the inadequacy of reason. When a fire breaks out in Amelia's house, Frederick rushes to the rescue. Seizing a ladder, he deliberates whether he ought to save Amelia or her father, for, as a thorough Godwinian, he realizes that, should he save the one of less benefit to society, he would be committing a shameful injustice. While he is thus debating, the roof crashes in and kills both objects of his reflection. When the peasants, believing Frederick had good reason to wish to get rid of Amelia, threaten him with violence, Mr. Fenton urges his son to flee. Then Frederick deliberates whether his flight or his death would more promote the cause of truth, but when he hears the roaring mob outside he decides on the former course. "I really did not see that any good would result from my being hanged."¹ Later Frederick and Dr. Alegos visit a strange land inhabited by Godwinians, and meeting a man in deep thought inquire the object of his reflections. "I am debating," he replies, "whether it will be most to the public good, that I should help half an hour at getting in the harvest, or labour half an hour at building the new granary; I have spent all the morning in considering, and cannot determine."² In these fantastic instances the utilitarian idea results merely in futile mental exertion, absolute paralysis of the power of action, and the defeat of the benevolent impulse.

The doctrine of philanthropy is responsible for other equally startling situations. In obvious satire upon Emma Courteney's pursuit of Harley, under the spur of passion and a Godwinian sense of duty to herself and posterity, Bridgetina Botherim, infatuated with Dr. Sidney and inspired to serve the cause of general utility, abandons her old mother and follows him to London. When he puts her off, she waylays him wherever she can; when he flees from her as from a Nemesis, she bombards him with letters, fortified by the Godwinian conviction that as the reason is always accessible to argument it is necessary only to ply long enough a catapult of logic. In view

¹ *The Vagabond*, Vol. I, chap. iv. Godwin had maintained that under such circumstances Fenslon's valet should save the philosopher in preference to his own father. In *Edmund Oliver* (I, 128), Lloyd condemns this decision.

² Vol. II, chap. viii.

of her daughter's vagaries, one is not surprised that Bridgetina's illiterate old mother inquires with asperity: "And who is this General Utility whose name is forever in Biddy's mouth? She is always in a fret when I ask her, as if I should know all about him as well as she; but I am sure she may well know I never seed a General but General Villiers, in all my life." The anonymous writer of *Dorothea* represents her heroine as debating with herself whether she will marry a philosopher or an aristocrat, and as deciding in favor of the latter on the unsentimental ground that the good of society requires that she seize this opportunity to uproot the prejudices of a conservative.¹ Out of solicitude for humanity Frederick refuses to fight a duel and hazard the possibility of depriving the world of his services.² Vallaton betrays to the Revolutionary Tribunal an old man to whom he owes seven hundred pounds sterling, having convinced himself that this money belongs to him because he can accomplish the greater good with it.³ Desirous of Arnon's property, Marauder tries to persuade him as "a citizen of the world" and "a lover of political justice" not to be influenced by such a weakness as love for a son.⁴ After he has robbed his wife of her property and deserted her and his children, Williams cries: "Justice, immutable and unerring justice, lifts me above all selfish ties and considerations; I am neither father, husband, or brother to any individual! my children are posterity in the aggregate! I am wedded only to universal philanthropy, and my brother is man!"⁵ Thus the novelists make clear their belief that, were Godwin's doctrine of the greatest good to the greatest number put in practice, it would encourage miserable self-deception and let loose upon society all the evils of a fatuous and, in many cases, criminal egoism.

Godwin never sinned against consistency. He eulogized liberty; it followed that he execrated marriage. It is absurd to expect continual agreement in inclination between two developing personalities. Whenever the man or the woman experiences discomfort from the restraints of an uncongenial union, let either him or her be free to

¹ I, 117.

² *The Vagabond*, Vol. I, chap. iii.

³ *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers*, I, 73.

⁴ *The Infernal Quizote*, III, 107.

⁵ *Dorothea*, II, 148.

leave the other; Godwin did not shrink even from the suggestion that marriage be abolished. This was his protest; his critics construed it merely as a plea for licentiousness. The Godwinian villains specially seem to be convinced that wedlock is a species of despotism; the novelists represent them as preying upon innocence, and as a warning depict the miseries of innumerable Clarissa Harlowes. No novel is without its ruined virgin or betrayed wife. A few, indeed, like Mrs. West's *A Tale of the Times* and Mrs. Opie's *Adeline Mowbray*, give more attention to this aspect of Godwinism than to any other. The moral is always the obvious one: the woman who repudiates marriage is ostracized by society, and is, in the end, generally abandoned by her lover. Having been left to her own pursuits, Adeline Mowbray has read much revolutionary literature and is fired with a desire to carry her doctrines into practice. She meets a young philosopher, Glenmurry, who has written against marriage, and in time becomes his mistress. Society begins its punishment; because she knows the purity of her own motives Adeline suffers all the more when she is ignored by Glenmurry's friends, sneered at by servants, insulted by libertines, and driven from town as soon as her past is discovered. When, broken by her sorrows, she lies on her deathbed, she confesses the folly of her doctrines and admits her misery justly inflicted. Waldorf, the hero of Miss King's novel, having wrecked the lives of three women, is overwhelmed at the enormity of the evils he has brought upon others by his fallacious teachings, and in his remorse shoots himself. *The Citizen's Daughter, or What Might Be* shows by contrast the admirable self-respect and worth of a wife who, refusing to be the dupe of her feelings, is not deluded by the new liberal doctrines of sex-relationship and scornfully rejects the dishonorable proposals of a lover. This is a reproof to Mary Wollstonecraft, who had protested that the spiritual bondage of a woman unhappily married justified her in seeking a congenial mate.

The tendency of Godwin's assault upon marriage was to provide men and women of strong passions with a sophistical excuse for unrestrained indulgence. That is a danger the novelists never grow tired of emphasizing. The majority of their philosophers are rakes. In order to join a Utopian settlement among the Hottentots, Mr. Glib abandons his wife and five children on the ground that, convinced

that marriage is the worst of monopolies (Godwin's own words), he wishes to restore to his wife the liberty of which she has been deprived. She takes the hint and departs with a recruiting officer.¹ When Mrs. Cloudley elopes with Captain Ivory, she enlightens her husband as to the parentage of a brood of children he thought his own. Lucretia is the offspring of a coachman; Amazonia is legitimate and so, probably, is Brutus; but Voltaire is the son of a hairdresser, Hercules of a plowman, Tom Paine of a rat-catcher, and the child that died, of Marauder.² Mr. Cloudley's mind becomes unhinged, and liberal quotations from Godwin make clear where rests the responsibility for the condition of affairs.³

The novelists do not spare other doctrines of *Political Justice*. They portray the Godwinians as committing petty theft, forgery, and highway robbery, and justifying their actions as attempts to equalize the distribution of property. They are not chary with the abuse and ridicule which Godwin's conception of perfectibility invites. Mr. Vapour anticipates an age of reason in which men will not feel the need of either food or clothing,⁴ and Williams foresees such a complete conquest of matter by mind that in the future to yield to death will be a contemptible weakness.⁵ Walker gives an account of a land governed by Godwinian principles; it is as grotesque as Gulliver's kingdom of Lagado.⁶ Formerly it possessed a noble civilization, but since the adoption of Godwinism, effected after a terrible civil war, it has fallen into decay. As the possibility of reward has been excluded lest it destroy the condition of equality, all incentive to effort has been annihilated, the people have become indolent and vicious for want of something to do, and genius, having no hope of encouragement, does not exert its power to contrive new inventions for the benefit of the race. Parecho, a citizen of the republic, regrets the old order and is in favor of aristocratic government. Completely disillusioned, Dr. Alogos determines to return to

¹ *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers*, III, 56.

² *The Infernal Quizote*, III, 201.

³ Mrs. West's *The Infidel Father* (1802) and the anonymous *Memoirs of M. de Brinboe* (1805) also attack, in passing, Godwin's conception of marriage.

⁴ *Letters of a Hindoo Rajah*, II, 148.

⁵ *Dorothea*, I, 48.

⁶ *The Vagabond*, Vol. II, chap. vii.

England to warn his fellow-countrymen against the evils they will bring upon themselves if they yield to the seductions of the New Philosophy.

The poetic justice that governs these novels is significant of the contemporary judgment of Godwinians. Bitter experience cures many of their philosophical vagaries. Mr. Myope, robbed of his mistress by a disciple, sees the light and lends a willing ear to Christianity. Mr. Glib repents and returns to his wife and children. Bridgetina is reconciled to the duties of a considerate daughter and Dorothea to those of a submissive wife. Ruined heroines all confess their error and either become insane, commit suicide, or go into a decline. Interrupted in the writing of a book entitled *The Supremacy of Reason* by the news that his cousin whom he had ruined had killed herself, Mr. Sceptic loses his mind and makes an effective use of a pistol. For a similar reason Waldorf violently puts an end to his life. His philosophical instructor Lok dies of grief and regret. The Godwinian villains who refuse to repent are dealt with unsparingly. Marauder, driven to bay, goes mad and hurls himself from a cliff; Fitzosborne kills himself in prison during the Terror; Williams is stabbed by one of his victims; Stupeo is burned alive by most un-Rousseauistic Indians; and Denham and Vallaton die upon the scaffold. *In pace requiescant!*

Such are the "novels of buffoonery and scandal" which Godwin refused to discuss in his reply to Dr. Parr's "Spital Sermon." It is clear that, whether satiric or serious, these novels represent the reaction of common sense against speculation typical of the age—a distorted conception of human nature, an absurd theory of perfectibility, and a visionary scheme of social reconstruction. But in justice to Godwin we should bear in mind that his hope of a millennial world without law or government and inhabited by childless rationalists was no farther removed from actuality than Rousseau's state of nature; both were the product of impotent idealism. This was an age of extremes, and rationalism and sentimentalism were equally guilty in committing sins of extravagant optimism. But, although we cannot approve of the savage intolerance of many of Godwin's opponents, and although we cannot admit that the novelists, in preaching the gospel of things as they are, always succeeded in disposing of the

issues raised by Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, since individualistic critics of marriage in our own age are still troubled by problems fundamentally the same, yet there can be no question that in general time has confirmed Godwin's contemporaries in the matter of their adverse judgment of the fundamental principles of *Political Justice*. It was inevitable that, after the first flush of enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause had passed away, many of Godwin's disciples should desert him, and that he himself should suffer the punishment of a defender of a hated and expiring cause. Yet in 1813, at the very time when Crabb Robinson records that Godwin was living in retirement, having almost been driven from society, the philosopher had a new, young disciple, a poet who was destined to embody the sophistries of *Political Justice* in forms of imperishable, intense beauty. That young disciple was none other than Percy Bysshe Shelley.

B. SPRAGUE ALLEN

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY



SPENSER'S TWELVE MORAL VIRTUES "ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE." II

After attempting to show that the virtues of Spenser's six¹ Books are not the ones discussed by Aristotle, Jusserand contends that Spenser's and Aristotle's virtues are unlike in that Aristotle treats all his virtues as means between extremes, even straining absurdly to do so, whereas Spenser treats only one of his, Temperance, as a mean, and it "only incidentally."² He admits that, "Either through direct or indirect borrowings, [Spenser] took from [Aristotle] his notion of the middle or virtuous state, standing between two faulty extremes." But he adds, "He did not try, as Aristotle did, to apply this theory to every virtue. It is only incidentally dwelt upon, forming the episode of Guyon's visit to Medina, Book II, c. 2."³ This point is important; for Jusserand's criticism means that Spenser ignored, almost completely, Aristotle's fundamental conception of what a virtue is—ignored what is the most important and characteristic thing about Aristotle's moral philosophy. Let us see if he did.

Expressed in terms of method, Aristotle's moral philosophy is essentially this: (1) He develops a virtue by showing its opposites, and by discussing various phases of the virtue and of its opposites.⁴ He treats a virtue as a mean between two extremes;⁵ but he discusses various phases of the mean and of its extremes, and he tends to make any given virtue include all the others;⁶ so that his virtues become a kind of center surrounded by many opposites.⁷ (2) He gives great emphasis to what he calls "the opposite" of a virtue, and

¹ M. Jusserand holds that the fragment called Book VII is not a part of the *F. Q.* Therefore, he does not discuss it. I hope to discuss this fragment in a subsequent paper. "Book VII" is certainly Aristotelian.

² *Med. Phil.*, III, 374, 381, and note.

³ *Ibid.*, 381 and note.

⁴ See *N. Eth.*, III, ix ff.; IV; and V. See also II, vii.

⁵ See his definition of virtue "regarded in its essence or theoretical conception," *N. Eth.*, II, vi. See also II, viii.

⁶ See his explanation of his definition of virtue, *N. Eth.*, VI, especially chaps. i and xiii.

⁷ See *N. Eth.*, II, v; and II, ix.

says less, and in some cases almost nothing, about the other extreme, for his mean is not arithmetical; one who aims at the mean, he says, must, like Ulysses, keep farthest from Charybdis, the more dangerous of the two extremes.¹ And (3) he makes Reason the determiner of the right course in the case of each of the moral virtues.²

Such is the essence of Aristotle's moral philosophy. If, as Jusserand contends, Spenser ignores one of these principles, he is certainly not following Aristotle. If, as I shall undertake to prove, he applies all of these principles in his treatment of the virtues, he certainly does follow Aristotle, at least in essentials.

Spenser certainly develops the virtue of Holiness by showing its opposites, and by presenting various phases of the virtue and of its opposites. He represents Holiness by the Knight of Holiness (High-mindedness, moral perfection), Una (Christian Truth), Faith, Hope, and Charity, Heavenly Contemplation, and so on; and around these he groups Paganism, or Infidelity, "Blind Devotion"³ (Corceca), Monastic Superstition (Abessa), "Hypocrise"⁴ (Archimago), Falsehood (Duessa, "faire Falsehood"⁵), False Pride or Conceit (Orgoglio and Lucifera), the Seven Deadly Sins and all the other vices, Error (the Dragon of Error in the first canto), and Satan (in Lucifera's train, and the Dragon of Evil in canto xi).

Moreover, he represents the virtue as a mean between extremes and emphasizes one extreme. Paganism, represented by the Paynim brethren Sansfoy (Unbelief), Sansjoy (Joylessness), and Sansloy (Lawlessness), is certainly one extreme in regard to Holiness. The opposite extreme is represented by Corceca ("Blind Devotion"), Abessa (Monastic Superstition), and the Satyrs who worship even Una's ass. Corceca is an ignorant, blind old woman who says thirty-six hundred prayers every day. She dares not stop mumbling her prayers. Abessa is her daughter. Again, the Knight of Holiness is a mean between sinful 'joyaunce' and joyless faith and abstinence, though it costs him hard fighting to keep to this mean. After he has slain the Paynim Sansfoy (canto ii), he successfully resists (canto iv) the temptation to join with Duessa in the "joyaunce" of the gay party composed of the Seven Deadly Sins. But immediately after he has resisted the joyance of sin, he is attacked

¹ See *N. Eth.*, II, ix.

² *Ibid.*, II, vi.

³ I, iii, Arg.

⁴ I, i, Arg.

⁵ I, ii, Arg.

by the Paynim Sansjoy, who proposes to cancel his victory over Sansfoy by taking away the shield which is the emblem of his victory.¹ He is least fortified on the side of Joylessness; we are told upon our first introduction to him that "of his cheere [he] did seeme too solemne sad."² Accordingly, the battle which ensues with Sansjoy is one of the hardest of his career.³ Once more, the Knight of Holiness is, as we have already seen, Aristotle's mean of Highmindedness. He thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them; he neither overestimates nor underestimates his own worth—he is neither conceited nor meanminded. Arthur also represents this mean of Highmindedness. He thinks himself worthy of great honor, and is worthy of it. He aspires to the hand of great Gloriana (Glory), but we know, not only from his moral perfection, but also from the direct testimony of Una and the Knight of Holiness, that he is worthy of her.⁴ According to Aristotle, the worst case of Mean-mindedness, one of the two extremes in regard to Highmindedness, is the man of great worth who underestimates his own deserts—cares too little for honor. Sir Satyrane, in a measure, illustrates this extreme. We feel that he is capable of as great things as Guyon or Calidore. Yet he disappoints us; he does nothing supremely great. Although he is possessed of great worth and wins fame—"through all Faery lond his famous worth was blown"⁵—he cares nothing for great honor. He is not among those who seek quests from great Gloriana,

That glorie does to them for guerdon graunt.⁶

To represent Conceit, the other main extreme in regard to High-mindedness, two characters are drawn, one masculine and one feminine. Orgoglio (Ital. *orgoglio*, pride; cf. GK. *ὀργάω*), though born of dirt and wind, and fostered by Ignaro (Ignorance), thinks himself very great. But when he is slain by the Knight of Holiness, his huge trunk collapses like a punctured bladder, showing that he is puffed up with conceit. Lucifera (the sinful mistress of the "house

¹ For the joyfulness of Faith, see Spenser's description of Faith (Fidella) in canto x, especially stanzas 12–14.

² I, i, 2.

³ For the importance which Spenser attaches to this battle against joylessness, see the author's comments in canto v, stanza 1.

⁴ I, ix, 16, 17.

⁵ I, vi, 29.

⁶ I, x, 59.

of Pryde"¹) is excessively proud and supercilious, though she is only the daughter of "Griesly Pluto" and the "Queene of Hell" and is thoroughly unworthy of honor. She includes all the Seven Deadly Sins, as Highmindedness includes all the virtues. Duessa also serves to represent Conceit,² though her main business is to represent Falsehood; she is very proud of her beauty and finery, but when stripped of false show, she proves to be only a filthy old hag. Clearly Spenser's emphasis is on the extreme of Conceit or False Pride.

Finally, Spenser certainly makes Reason the determiner of the mean for the virtue of Holiness. In canto ii the arch-deceiver Archimago makes the Knight of Holiness believe that his lady, Una, has stained her honor. Enraged, the Knight deserts Una, for whom he has undertaken to slay the Dragon of Evil, and rides off alone. He has ceased to be governed by Reason. We are told:

The eye of [his] reason was with rage yblent.³

Later we see again that he is guided not by Reason, but by 'will':

Will was his guide, and grieve led him astray.⁴

This is the beginning of all his troubles. He now misses the mean of Highmindedness. After a narrow escape from the House of Pride with its vices and pitiable victims, he is captured by Orgoglio (False Pride, Conceit) and languishes in his prison until rescued by Arthur (Highmindedness). Again, in canto vii, Arthur meets the deserted Una. In persuading her to unfold her grief, he advises her that "flesh may empaire . . . but reason can repaire."⁵ And "his goodly reason"⁶ wins. Thus we see that both Una and the Knight of Holiness must be governed by Reason. But so must Arthur. In canto ix, in which Arthur tells of the vision which caused him to fall in love with Gloriana, and of his pursuit of Glory, Arthur says:

But me had warnd old Timons wise behest,
Those creeping flames by reason to subdew, etc.⁷

Here again Reason is the determiner of the mean in regard to Highmindedness, or love of honor. Finally, even the Paynim Sansfoy apologizes for forgetting "the raines to hold of reasons rule."⁸

¹ I, iv, Arg.

² Note in I, iv, 37, that Duessa rides next to Lucifera.

³ Stanza 5. ⁴ Stanza 12. ⁵ Stanza 41. ⁶ Stanza 42. ⁷ Stanza 9. ⁸ I, iv, 41

We come now to Temperance. Everyone knows that Spenser develops this virtue and the virtues of all his other Books by showing their opposites and by presenting various phases of the virtue and of its opposites, and that he tends to make any given virtue all-inclusive. From the book of any one of Spenser's virtues a good case could be made out for all the moral virtues. But Spenser not only presents various phases of Temperance; he treats the same phases of Temperance that Aristotle treats. For example, outside of Temperance and Incontinence in the strict sense, the kinds of intemperance most emphasized by Aristotle are incontinence in regard to angry passion, incontinence in regard to honor, and incontinence in regard to wealth or gain. Aristotle specially and repeatedly mentions these as things in regard to which men may be incontinent in the broad sense. For instance, he says: "Men are called incontinent in respect of angry passion, honor, and gain."¹ Now these are the very kinds of intemperance which, outside of intemperance in the strict sense, Spenser presents most strongly. Angry passion Spenser exemplifies in Furor; in Phedon, who, "chawing vengeance,"² murders his sweetheart and his bosom friend, and is trying to murder his sweetheart's maid when he falls into the hands of Furor; and in Pyrochles, who "Furors chayne unbinds."³ Incontinence in respect of honor Spenser exemplifies in "Vaine Braggadocchio."⁴ He is one of Aristotle's "Conceited people," who, says Aristotle, "are foolish and ignorant of themselves and make themselves conspicuous by being so. . . . They get themselves up in fine dresses, and pose for effect, and so on, and wish their good fortune to be known to all the world, and talk about themselves as if that were the road to honor."⁵ Braggadocchio represents Conceit, or desire of honor by one who is unworthy of it, one of the opposites of Highmindedness, or right love of honor on a great scale. Again, one of the greatest of the temptations in Spenser's Cave of Mammon is Ambition, one of Aristotle's extremes in regard to ordinary honors. Incontinence in regard to wealth or gain is, of course, powerfully presented in Mammon, who tempts the Knight of Temperance in canto vii.

But, in addition to treating it as a kind of center surrounded by opposites, Spenser treats Temperance as a mean between extremes,

¹ *N. Eth.*, VII, ii. ² II, iv, 29. ³ II, v, Arg. ⁴ II, iii, Arg. ⁵ *N. Eth.*, IV, ix.

emphasizes one extreme in particular, and makes Reason the determiner of the mean. In the first canto of his Book on Temperance, he works out Aristotle's mean concerning Temperance. Although Aristotle holds that all the virtues are concerned with pleasure and pain, he gives peculiar emphasis to the relation of Temperance to pleasure and pain in his definition of the virtue. He says: "In respect of pleasures and pains, although not indeed of all pleasures and pains, and to a less extent in respect of pains than of pleasures, the mean state is Temperance."¹ Again, in connection with Incontinence, Aristotle gives an important place to the vice of Effeminacy. He says:

Of the characters which have been described the one [incontinence] is rather a kind of effeminacy; the other is licentiousness. The opposite of the incontinent character is the continent, and of the effeminate the steadfast; for steadfastness consists in holding out against pain, and continence in overcoming pleasure, and it is one thing to hold out, and another to overcome, as it is one thing to escape being beaten and another to win a victory. . . . If a person gives way where people generally resist and are capable of resisting, he deserves to be called effeminate. . . . It is only unpardonable where a person is mastered by things against which most people succeed in holding out, and is impotent to struggle against them, unless his impotence be due to hereditary constitution or to disease, as effeminacy is hereditary in the kings of Scythia, or as woman is naturally weaker than a man.

And he continues: "It is people of a quick and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is particularly apt to take the form of impetuosity; for the rapidity or the violence of their feeling prevents them from waiting for the guidance of reason."² Finally, Aristotle condemns suicide as Effeminacy: "For it is effeminacy to fly from troubles, nor does the suicide face death because it is noble, but because it is a refuge from evil."³ In canto one of Spenser's Book on Temperance we have the story of Mordant and Amavia. Acrasia (Intemperance), a beautiful but wicked enchantress, entices Sir Mordant away from his wife and finally poisons him; and the wife, in a fit of grief, commits suicide. Sir Guyon (the Knight of Temperance) and his Palmer (Reason or Prudence), having learned the story from the expiring wife, stand looking at the two dead bodies. Sir Guyon, turning to his Palmer, says:

Old Syre
Behold the image of mortalitie,

¹ *N. Eth.*, II, vii.

² *Ibid.*, VII, viii.

³ *Ibid.*, III, xi.

And feeble nature cloth'd with fleshly tyre,
When raging passion with fierce tyrannie,
Robs *reason* of her due regalitie,
And makes it servant to her basest part:
The *strong* it weakens with infirmities,
And with bold furie armes the *weakest* hart;
The strong through *pleasure* soonest falles, the
 weake through *smart*.

Then Sir Guyon's Palmer (Reason) replies:

But *temperance* (said he) with golden squire
Betwixt them both can measure out a *meane*,
Neither to melt in *pleasures* whot desire,
Nor fry in hartlesse *griefe* and dolefull *teene*.
Thrise happie man, who *fares them both atweene*.¹

Thus the incontinent Sir Mordant and the effeminate Amavia meet disaster because they fail to take the mean which Reason dictates in regard to "pleasure" and "smart." It will be noted that Spenser follows Aristotle even in such details as showing that greater strength is required to overcome pleasure than to resist pain. The importance which Spenser attaches to the suicide described in the episode is indicated by the name Amavia (Love of Life). Love of Life effeminately gives way to pain. The lesson of this canto cannot possibly be called "only incidental"; for Sir Guyon's relation to Mordant and Amavia is one of the larger elements of the plot, and one of the few discussed in Spenser's letter to Raleigh. It is the fate of Mordant and Amavia at the hands of Acrasia (Intemperance) which causes Guyon, the Knight of Temperance, to enter upon his quest to bind Acrasia.

So much for canto i. In canto ii Spenser works out the mean in regard to Aristotelian Temperance in the strict, or particular, sense.² Here, to quote Spenser's argument to the canto, Sir Guyon is shown

the face of golden Meane.
Her sisters two Extremities
strive her to banish cleane.

Reason is made the determiner of the mean.³

What we have said of Spenser's treatment of Temperance as a mean between extremes is hardly more than a beginning of what

¹ II, i, 57-58.

² With the episode of Guyon's visit to Medina cf. *N. Eth.*, II, vii; III, xiii; and VII, xi.

³ See especially II, ii, 38. See also stanzas 15 and 17.

could be said if space permitted. See, for example, canto xii, which is a series of studies of the mean. The truth is that the whole Book is a study of the mean. Like Aristotle, Spenser puts the emphasis on the extreme of excess, not on that of deficiency. Again, we have mentioned only a few of the numerous instances in which Spenser makes Reason the determiner of the mean. See, for example, the author's comments in stanzas 1-2 of canto xi, in which Spenser lays down the general principle that Reason is the determiner of the mean in regard to Temperance. Another point is worth noting. Although Aristotle makes Reason the determiner of the mean in the case of each of the moral virtues, he gives peculiar emphasis to the rule of Reason in regard to Temperance. Accordingly, Spenser gives the greatest possible emphasis to the rule of reason in respect of Temperance. For example, Aristotle says in his discussion of Temperance: "As a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor (*παιδαγωγός*) so ought the concupiscent element in man to live according to the reason."¹ And Spenser gives his Knight of Temperance a tutor, the black Palmer, who continually accompanies, instructs, and directs him, and whom his "pupil"² (Guyon) faithfully obeys. It is hardly necessary to add that Guyon's Palmer is Reason. If other proof than the allegory be needed that he is so, it may be found, for example, in II, i, 34; or in II, iv, 2; or in II, xii, 38.

Passing to Chastity, Book III, we find that Spenser again follows Aristotle's method of treating a virtue and his conception of what a virtue is. Even Chastity is presented as a mean between extremes. Moreover, the extremes themselves are Aristotelian.

There is a very close relation between Shame, or Chastity, and Temperance. Both Aristotle and Spenser make Temperance include sex morality. The extremes of Aristotelian Shame, or Modesty, in the strict sense, are Shamelessness and Licentiousness, on the one hand, and Bashfulness, lack of courteous bearing, on the other.³ The extremes of Aristotelian Temperance, in the strict sense, are Licentiousness and Incontinence, on the one hand, and Insensibility, or Asceticism, on the other.⁴ Now it will be remembered that

¹ *N. Eth.*, III, xv.

² II, viii, 7.

³ *N. Eth.*, II, vii, and IV, xv; *Rhetoric*, II, vi, and II, xii-xiii.

⁴ *N. Eth.*, II, vii; III, xiii-xv; VII, especially chap. xi.

Spenser in his discussion of Chastity draws not only upon Aristotle's discussion of Shame, or Modesty, but also upon that part of his discussion of Temperance which has to do with sex morality. Accordingly he makes the extremes of his virtue of Chastity the Aristotelian extremes of Shamelessness, Licentiousness, and Incontinence, on the one hand, and Discourtesy and Insensibility, or Asceticism, or Celibacy, on the other.

In the poem to the Book on Chastity, Spenser tells us that just as Gloriana represents the rule of Elizabeth, so Belpheobe represents "her rare chastity," and he makes the same point in his letter to Raleigh. In telling how Belpheobe cared for her "flower" of "chastity and virtue virginal," he indicates the extremes:

That dainty Rose, the daughter of the Morne,
More deare then life she tendered, whose flowre
The girland of her honour did adorne:
Ne suffred she the *Middayes scorching powre*,
Ne the *sharp Northerne wind* thereon to showre,
But lapped up her silken leaves most chaire,
When so the froward skye began to lowre:
But soone as calmed was the Christall aire,
She did it faire dispred, and let to florish faire.¹

For the Courtesy of Belpheobe see, in III, v, 27-55,² the story of her nursing the wounded Timias and of her treatment of him, a social inferior, when he falls in love with her. Belpheobe is praised because she can be chaste without running into the extreme of Discourtesy:

In so great prayse of stedfast *chastity*,
Nathlesse she was so *curteous and kind*,
Tempred with *grace* and goodly *modesty*,
That seemed those *two vertues* strove to find
The higher place in her Heroick mind.

To realize the seriousness of this extreme of Discourtesy it is only necessary to note the contemptible character of the discourteous Mirabella in Spenser's Book on Courtesy. Discourtesy here clearly includes the idea of celibacy. It should be remembered that Spenser's Courtesy is Aristotle's Friendliness—readiness to act as a true friend

¹ III, v, 51. See also stanzas 50-55, especially 52.

² Note especially III, v, 54-55. See also III, vi, 1-3.

would act—and that, with both Aristotle and Spenser, Friendship includes love. In his argument to canto vii of Book VI Spenser tells us that we are to learn of “Fayre Mirabellaes punishment for loves disdaine decreed.” Mirabella is cruel to her lovers and even boasts of the fact that they suffer and die because of their love for her. “She did all love despize.” She is determined to live a life of celibacy.

She was borne free, not bound to any wight,
And so would ever live, and love her owne delight.¹

Such is the Discourtesy, or Unfriendliness, which is one of the extremes in regard to Chasity. Mirabella is finally brought to justice by Cupid.

Another passage in which Spenser represents Discourtesy and Celibacy as an extreme in regard to Chastity is in canto vi of the Book on Chastity. Venus has lost her little son, Cupid. In searching a wood for him, she comes upon her sister, Diana, of whom she makes inquiries. Diana is ungracious, intolerant:

Thereat Diana gan to smile, in scorne
Of her vaine plaint, and to her scoffing sayd;
“Great pittie sure, that ye be so forlorne
Of your gay sonne, that gives you so good ayd
To your disports: ill mote ye bene apayd.”
But she was more engrieved, and replide;
“Faire sister, ill beseemes it to upbrayd
A dolefull heart with so disdainfull pride;
The like that mine, may be your paine another tide.

.
And ill becomes you with your loftie creasts,
To scorne the joy, that Jove is glad to seek;
We both are bound to follow heavens beheasts,
And tend our charges with obeisance meeke.
Spare, gentle sister, with reproch my paine to eeke.”²

After Diana has made further insulting speeches, she is finally induced to join in the search for Cupid. While searching, Diana and Venus find Belpheobe and Amoretta, two babes born at a birth, Belpheobe being born first, and then Amoretta, to show that first comes maidenly chastity, “perfect Maydenhed,” and then love and

¹ VI, vii, 30-31.

² III, vi, 21-22.

"goodly womanhed." Diana and Venus decide each to adopt one of the babes.

Dame Phoebe [Diana] to a Nymph her babe betooke,
To be upbrought in perfect Maydenhed,
And to her selfe her name Belpheobe red:
But Venus hers thence farre away conwayed,
To be upbrought in goodly womanhed.¹

Venus takes Amoretta to be brought up in the Garden of Adonis, where, we are told,

All things, as they created were, doe grow,
And yet remember well *the mightie word*,
Which first was spoken by th' Almighty lord,
*That bad them to increase and multiply.*²

Perhaps Spenser's plainest condemnation of Celibacy and Insensibility, or Asceticism, is the episode dealing with Marinell in the Book on Chastity. Marinell is "a mighty man at arms." He eschews the love of women, for Proteus, the sea-god and prophet, has taught his mother to keep him from all womankind:

For thy she gave him warning every day,
The love of women not to entertaine;
A lesson too too hard for living clay,
From love in course of Nature to refraine:
Yet he his mothers lore did well retaine,
And ever from faire Ladies love did fly;
Yet many Ladies fair did oft complaine,
That they for love of him would algates dy:
Dy, who so list for him, he was loves enemy.³

One of the first great victories of Britomart (Chastity) is her defeat of this sturdy champion.

Though Britomart leaves Marinell for dead, his mother, Cymoent, by her magic finally revives him. We now learn that fair Florimell loves Marinell, but is scorned by him. In canto xi of Book IV Spenser gives a synopsis of the story of Marinell and Florimell, in order to continue it. The lovely Florimell, because she will not grant her love to the sea-god Proteus, is suffering horrible torments at Proteus' hands.

And all this was for love of Marinell,
Who her despysed (ah who would her despyse?)
And *wemens love did from his hart expell*,
• And all those joyes that weak mankind entyse.⁴

¹ III, vi, 28.

² III, vi, 34.

³ III, iv, 25-26.

⁴ IV, xi, 5.

Clearly this is Celibacy and Insensibility, or Asceticism. Marinell is finally reformed by the love of Florimell.

One more episode might be given here. It is in the opening canto of the Book on Chastity. Britomart, who fights for Chastity, and the Red Cross Knight (Holiness), who "gave her good aid," come in their journey to "Castle Joyous," presided over by the witch Malecasta, called "the Lady of Delight." In the "sumptuous guise" of Castle Joyous the knights see

The image of superfluous riotize,
Exceeding much the state of meane degree.¹

Smith and Selincourt define the term "meane," in this passage, as "middling"; and indeed the context seems to make any other interpretation impossible.

Proof that the contemptible Mirabella of the Book on Courtesy is Discourtesy (if that can need special proof), and that Marinell of the Book on Chastity also illustrates Discourtesy—both being guilty of the serious offense of Cruelty, Unfriendliness, toward their lovers—may be had by comparing their conduct with the Courtesy of Britomart (Chastity) toward even the amorous "Lady of Delight," who, deceived by Britomart's armor, woos the Knight of Chastity in no modest manner. Britomart considers the feelings of other people and therefore does not rebuff the Lady of Delight until her conduct becomes outrageous:

For thy she would not in discourteise wise,
Scorne the faire offer of good will profest;
For great rebuke it is, love to despise,
Or rudely sdiegne a gentle harts request.²

Finally, a consideration of the characters in Book III shows plainly that Spenser treats Chastity as a mean, and that his extremes are the Aristotelian ones already mentioned. Marinell and Diana go to extremes in the direction of Discourtesy and Celibacy. Britomart, Belphebe, Amoretta, and the true Florimell represent the mean. The extreme of Licentiousness is emphatically represented in the horrible Titan twins, Argante and Ollyphant, the hyena-like Brute, Proteus, Malecasta, the false Florimell, the infamous Hellenore, and Busyrane.

¹ III, i, 33.

² III, i, 55.

In addition to treating Chastity as a mean, Spenser not only discusses various phases of the virtue, after the manner of Aristotle, but draws from Aristotle the virtues and vices which he discusses in connection with Chastity. This fact throws light on an otherwise difficult passage in the *Faerie Queene*. In his continued discussion of Temperance,¹ already referred to, Aristotle has a curious discussion of brutality, or unnatural vice. "There is more excuse," he says, "for following natural impulses, as indeed there is for following all such desires as are common to all the world, and the more common they are, the more excusable they are also."² Again he says, "And if these are brutal states, there are others which are produced in some people by disease and madness. . . . Other such states again are the result of a morbid disposition or of habit." In this brutal or unnatural conduct he includes "unnatural vice," which he elsewhere refers to as "unnatural passion."³ Compare this with Book III, canto ii, of the *Faerie Queene*. Britomart, who represents Elizabeth as well as Chastity, is madly in love with Artegall (Justice). In the midst of this fine compliment to the Queen we have the following curious passage put in the mouth of Glauce, Britomart's old nurse, after Britomart has confessed her love:

Daughter (said she) what need ye be dismayd,
Or why make ye such Monster of your mind?
Of much more uncouth thing I was affrayd;
Of filthy lust, contrarie unto kind:
But this affection nothing straunge I find;
For who with *reason* can you aye reprove,
To love the semblant pleasing most your mind,
And yield your heart, whence ye cannot remove?
No guilt in you, but in the tyranny of love.

Not so th' Arabian Myrrhe did set her mind;
Nor so did Biblis spend her pining hart,
But lov'd their native flesh against all kind,
And to their purpose used wicked art:
Yet played Pasiphaë a more monstrous part,
That lov'd a bull, and learned a beast to bee;
Such *shamefull* lusts who loaths not, which depart
From course of *nature* and of *modestie*?
Sweet love such lewdness bands from his faire companie.⁴

¹ *N. Eth.*, VII, i and vi-vii.² *Ibid.*, VII, vii.³ *Ibid.*, VII, vi.⁴ III, ii, 40-41.

I cannot resist giving another example of Spenser's conformity to Aristotle's scheme. In cantos ix and x of Spenser's *Book on Chastity* we have the story of Hellenore and Malbecco. The latter, at first a real character, in canto x becomes Jealousy in one of the most powerful of all Spenser's personifications. It is the unlikeness of Malbecco and Hellenore which causes their great unhappiness. This unlikeness includes the fact that Malbecco has reached the age of impotence, while his wife is young. Their unhappiness results in the "rape" of Hellenore (Helen) by Paridell (Paris). That their unhappiness is brought about by their inequality and unlikeness is clear from reading the cantos. I quote a few passages, however, which establish this point by literal exposition:

But all his mind is set on mucky pelfe,
Yet is he lincked to a lovely lasse,

The which to him both far unequalle yeares,
And also far unlike conditions has;
For she does joy to play amongst her peares,
And to be free from hard restraint and gealous feares.

But he is old, and withered like hay,
Unfit faire Ladies service to supply.
The privie guilt whereof makes him alway
Suspect her truth, and keepe continuall spy
Upon her with his other blinked eye;
Ne suffreth he resort of living wight
Approch to her, ne keepe her company,
But in close bowre her mewes from all mens sight,
Depriv'd of kindly joy and naturall delight.

Malbecco he, and Hellenore she hight,
Unfitly yokt together in one teeme.

Fast good will with gentle courtesyes,
And timely service to her pleasures meet
May her perhaps containe, that else would algates fleet.¹

Now there is a very close relation between the virtues of Chastity and Friendship, for Aristotle makes Friendship include love and the relation of husband and wife.² Again, Aristotle repeatedly makes

¹ III, ix, 4-7.

² That Aristotelian Friendship includes love is clear from the whole of Book VIII of *N. Eth.* The Friendship of husband and wife is discussed specifically in chap. xii.

the point that perfect Friendship requires perfect equality and likeness, and that any Friendship requires approximate equality and likeness. For example, he says: "In Friendship quantitative equality is first and proportionate second. This is clearly seen to be the case if there be a wide distinction between two persons in respect of virtue, vice, affluence, or anything else. For persons so widely different cease to be friends; they do not even affect to be friends."¹ Thus the lesson that the inequality and unlikeness of Malbecco and Hellenore is the cause of their destruction is straight Aristotelian doctrine. But this is not all. In the *Politics*, which is a continuation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,² Aristotle discusses the subject of marriage. At the beginning of chapter xvi of Book VI he says:

In legislating about this association [marriage] he [the legislator] should have in view, not only the persons themselves who are to marry, but their time of life, so that they may arrive simultaneously at corresponding periods in respect of age, and there may not be a discrepancy between their powers, whether it is that the husband is still able to beget children and the wife is not, or *vice versa*, as this is a state of things which is a source of mutual bickerings and dissensions.

And Aristotle reiterates the idea throughout the chapter. That this point is the part of the lesson to which Spenser gives emphasis is clear, not only from the story and the literal exposition, but also from the name Malbecco.³ But even the idea of the impotent old husband's love of money and disregard of honor is Aristotelian. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, iii, Aristotle says: "Illiberality is incurable; for it seems that old age or impotence of any kind makes men illiberal," and he repeats this thought in the *Rhetoric*.⁴

Again, Spenser makes it indisputably clear that reason is the determiner of the right course in respect of Chastity. Thus, as we have already seen, the old nurse Glauce, who in a measure represents Reason, or Prudence, assures Britomart (Chastity) that her conduct

¹ *N. Eth.*, VIII, ix.

² Not only the last chapter of the *N. Eth.* but the whole book prepares the way for the *Politics*. It is upon the relation between Morality and Reason, or Prudence, explained in the *N. Eth.*, that the legislator of the *Politics* bases his laws.

³ Ital. *becco*, a buck, a goat, a cuckold; cf. Marston, *Malcontent*, I, i, 118-20:

M. Duke, thou art a becco, a cornuto.

P. How?

M. Thou art a cuckold.

⁴ II, xiii.

is right, for it is in accordance with Reason.¹ On the other hand, we are told concerning the unholy passion of the witch's son:

So strong is passion that no reason hears.²

In discussing the virtue of Friendship, Spenser does not make much of the mean. But neither does his master. Aristotle only suggests that perhaps we ought to observe the mean in regard to the number of friendships which we undertake to maintain. Like Aristotle, however, Spenser does develop the virtue of Friendship by showing its opposites and by presenting various phases of the virtue and of its opposites. Thus he discusses Discord as well as Concord, Hate as well as Love,³ Falseness (Duessa) as well as "Friendship trew." He shows not only the friendship of the virtuous, as seen in such cases as that of Cambel and Triamond, but also the friendship of the vicious, friendship for gain, and so on, in such cases as the friendship of Blandamour and Paridell, which, in accordance with Aristotle's teaching, soon ends in strife.⁴ Professor Erskine⁵ asserts that Spenser's Book on Friendship "seems at first sight to treat only of jealousies and quarrels." He brings forward *two sentences* of Cicero from which he thinks Spenser must have learned that it was possible to present Friendship by showing its opposite. The fact is that in presenting Friendship by showing its opposite Spenser is not only doing what Aristotle did in every one of his virtues, but is doing what he himself did in every book of the *Faerie Queene*.

Moreover, Spenser discusses the same opposites and phases of Friendship that Aristotle discusses. For example, Aristotle deals with the friendship of the virtuous, which endures, and the friendship of the vicious, friendship for gain, and so on, which does not endure. We have already seen that Spenser represents these phases of Friendship. Again, Aristotle's Friendship is of three main kinds: the friendship of kinsmen, the friendship of love, including marriage, and friendship in the ordinary sense.⁶ In IV, ix, 1-3 of the *Faerie Queene*, Spenser gives a plain, literal exposition of these three kinds

¹ III, ii, 40.

² III, vii, 21.

³ IV, x, 34 and 32.

⁴ IV, ii, 13, 18.

⁵ *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, XXIII, 846.

⁶ See, for example, *N. Eth.*, VIII, xii.

of Friendship, as Professor Erskine has observed;¹ and he reiterates this classification throughout the book.² Again, in connection with love Spenser illustrates the Aristotelian extremes of insensibility, or celibacy, unreasonable love, inconstancy, and licentiousness.³ Once more, in the Book on Friendship, as well as in the Book on Chastity, Spenser follows Aristotle in making equality and likeness essential to Friendship. Friendship is impossible between Cambell and any one of the three brothers, Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond.⁴ But when Triamond, by receiving the spirits of his two brothers, becomes the equal of Cambell, the two become perfect friends.⁵ Spenser does not stop, however, at showing friendship between these equals of high degree; he shows also friendship between two equal and like persons of low degree, the two squires in cantos viii and ix.⁶ Finally, the most striking thing about Aristotle's discussion of Friendship is his identification of this virtue with Concord in the State. He says: "Again, it seems that friendship or love is the bond which holds states together, and that legislators set more store by it than by justice; for concord is apparently akin to friendship, and it is concord that they especially seek to promote, and faction, as being hostility to the state, that they especially try to expel."⁷ Even this phase of Aristotelian Friendship is emphatically presented in the *Faerie Queene*. In the first canto of his Book on Friendship, Spenser presents Discord, the enemy of Friendship, whom the wicked witch Duessa has brought to hell "to trouble noble knights."

Her name was Ate, mother of *debate*,
And all *dissention* which doth dayly grow
Amongst fraile men, that many a *publike state*
And many a *private* oft doth overthrow.

.
Hard by the gates of hell her dwelling is,

.
Yet many waies to enter may be found,

¹ *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, XXIII, 849.

² Note, for example, the "friends," "brethren," and "lovers" of IV, i, 24.

³ See IV, ix, 21.

⁴ IV, ii-iii.

⁵ IV, iii, 26-37, especially 37.

⁶ See especially viii, 55-56, and ix, 10-11.

⁷ *N. Eth.*, VIII, i.

But none to issue forth when one is in:
For *discord* harder is to end then to begin.

And all within the riven walls were hung
With ragged monuments of times forepast,
All which the sad effects of *discord* sung.

Among these "monuments" are "broken scepters," "great cities ransackt," and "nations captived and huge armies slaine." "There was the signe of antique Babylon," of Thebes, of Rome, of Salem, and "sad Ilion." There were the names of Nimrod and "of Alexander, and his Princes five Which shar'd to them the spoiles that he had got alive." And there too were the "relicks . . . of the dreadfull *discord*, which did drive The noble Argonauts to outrage fell."

For all this worlds faire workmanship she tride,
Unto his last confusion to bring,
And that great golden chaine quite to divide,
With which it blessed *Concord* hath together tide.

Thus Spenser follows Aristotle in making Friendship include Concord in the State. The same idea comes out in Spenser's presentation of Concord in canto x:

Concord she cleeped was in common reed,
Mother of blessed *Peace*, and Friendship trew.¹

In discussing his fifth virtue, Justice, Spenser expresses the mean in almost the exact words of Aristotle. Aristotle tells us that particular Justice has to do with the goods of fortune.² He defines Justice as follows: "Just conduct is a mean between committing and suffering injustice; for to commit injustice is to have too much, and to suffer it is to have too little."³ In the proem to Book V Spenser in describing the Golden Age, when all men were just, says:

And all men sought their owne, and none no more.

Again, in Book V proper, Spenser's treatment of Justice as a mean is unmistakable. In canto ii we have the Gyant with his "huge great paire of ballance." Complaining that this world's goods are unjustly, because unequally, distributed, the Gyant proposes to weigh everything and make a just distribution. He has asserted

¹ IV, x, 34.

² N. *Eth.*, V, ii.

³ N. *Eth.*, V, ix.

that he "could *justly* weigh the *wrong and right*," and Artegall (Justice) is testing him. Artegall finally tells him:

But set the truth and set the right aside,
For they with wrong or falshood will not fare;
And put *two wrongs* together to be tride,
Or else *two falses*, each of equall share;
And then together doe them both compare.
For truth is one, and right is ever one.
So did he, and then plaine it did appeare,
Whether of them the greater were attone.
But right sate in the middest of the beame alone.

But he the right from thence did thrust away,
For it was not the right, which he did seeke;
But rather strove extremities to way,
Th' one to diminish th' other for to eeke.
For of the meane he greatly did misleeke.¹

At this point Talus, Artegall's iron squire (the iron hand of Justice), hurls the Gyant into the sea and drowns him. This mean which the Gyant "misleeke," and which Justice demands, is not simply a mean but Aristotle's mean of Justice; for it is the mean in regard to the distribution of the goods of fortune. Moreover, the episode is Aristotelian in every particular. Aristotle teaches that equality as applied to Justice must be proportionate, not absolute. Justice, he holds, demands that the goods of fortune be distributed proportionately to the varying degrees of virtue in the citizens.² He even protests particularly against an equalization of property and reiterates this protest.³

Spenser's characters in this Book represent not only the mean but also the two Aristotelian extremes in regard to Justice: that of accepting less than rightfully belongs to one, and that of taking more. The first is represented by the Squire who is wronged by Sir Sanglier. Sanglier will not "rest contented with his right,"⁴ but, "the fairere love to gaine," takes the Squire's Ladie and slays

¹ V, II, 45-49.

² *N. Eth.*, Book V. Aristotle makes the same point in his discussion of Friendship. See *N. Eth.*, VIII, ix.

³ See, for example, *Politics*, VIII, ix.

⁴ V, I, 17.

his own. The Squire complains to Artegall. Brought before Artegall for judgment, Sanglier defies his accuser, and testifies falsely that—

neither he did shed that Ladies bloud
Nor tooke away his love, but *his owne proper good*.

Then

Well did the Squire perceive himself too weake,
To aunswere his defiaunce in the field,
And rather chose his challenge off to breake,
Then to approve his right with speare and shield.
And rather guilty chose him selfe to yield.¹

Only by imitating Solomon is Artegall able to discover to whom the live Ladie belongs and who is the murderer. The other extreme is represented by Sanglier, the robber Pollente, his daughter Munera, the Gyant with the huge "ballance," and so on. Like Aristotle, Spenser puts the emphasis on the extreme of taking too much. The opposite of general Justice is represented by such characters as Grantorto (Great Wrong). The mean is seen in Artegall, Arthur, Britomart, and Mercilla (Equity).

The various phases of Justice discussed by Aristotle are clearly presented by Spenser, such as distributive justice, corrective justice, retaliation, equity, and so on. Spenser also plainly makes Reason the determiner of the mean in respect to Justice. See, for example, his literal exposition of Justice in V, ix, 1 ff.

Spenser's sixth virtue, Courtesy, is not only treated as a mean, but is exactly Aristotle's mean in regard to Friendliness. As we have already seen, Aristotle makes Friendliness consist in acting as a true friend would act.² He makes its extremes Surliness, Contentiousness, Unfriendliness, on the one hand, and Flattery and Obsequiousness, or Complaisance, on the other. His friendly man is pleasant to live with, for he is free from Surliness or Contentiousness; but he will not yield his approval or withhold his condemnation when wrong conduct is under consideration. This is why he is like a true friend. Here we have exactly the character of Spenser's Knight of Courtesy, as is shown, for example, by Spenser's literal exposition of Sir Calidore's Courtesy, in VI, i, 2-3. It is plain that the Blatant Beast,

¹ V, i, 23, 24.

² N. Eth., IV, xii.

which Calidore, the Knight of Courtesy, is to bind, is one extreme in regard to Courtesy. Blandina¹ represents the opposite extreme. Calidore is, of course, the mean. Clearly Spenser puts the emphasis on Surliness, Contentiousness. We have already seen that Spenser develops the virtue of Courtesy by showing its opposites and by presenting various phases of the virtue and of its opposites. Further, that Reason is the determiner of the right course in regard to this virtue Spenser repeatedly makes clear. Enias, for example, appeals to Arthur, who here represents Courtesy, to rescue—

Yond Lady and her Squire with foule despight
Abusde, against all *reason* and all law.²

Thus I have shown, beyond question I hope, that Spenser follows Aristotle in essentials. Incidentally many correspondences in details have been pointed out, but lack of space makes it impossible to show how numerous such correspondences are.

At one point Spenser interprets his Aristotle with considerable freedom. He assigns Magnificence to Arthur, "which vertue," he says, "for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the perfection of all the rest, and containeth in it them all," etc.³ Jusserand, conceiving that there is no warrant in Aristotle for any such statement, says, "He follows here, as a matter of fact, neither Aristotle nor the rest."⁴ Jusserand sees in Spenser's statement evidence that the poet's recollection of Aristotle was vague, and he finally intimates—what Professor Erskine, following him, states—that Spenser probably never had read Aristotle's *Ethics*.

Now suppose we could demonstrate that Spenser's memory did fail him at this point, that he actually was confused as to the Aristotelian meaning of Magnificence (*μεγαλοπρέπεια*). The fact would prove little. Greene,⁵ Herford,⁶ and others have proved that Spenser more than once forgot the thread of his own story in the *Faerie Queene*. If a slip in memory is evidence that Spenser knew little of, and had probably never read, Aristotle's *Ethics*, there is equal

¹ See especially VI, vi, 41-42.

² VI, viii, 6; see also VI, iii, 49.

³ Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh.

⁴ *Mod. Phil.*, III, 382.

⁵ *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, IV, 173 ff.

⁶ See Professor Child's edition of Spenser's poems, note to I, i, 52.

evidence that he knew little of, and had probably never read, the *Faerie Queene*. But there is no evidence that Spenser's memory did fail him at this point; and there is much evidence that it did not.

Let us see what authority exists in Aristotle for Spenser's assignment of Magnificence to the morally perfect Arthur. First we must decide what is Aristotle. Jusserand says: "Three treatises on morals have come down to us under the name of Aristotle; one alone, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, being, as it seems, truly his; the others appear to be a make-up, drawn from his teachings by some disciples."¹ This is a kind of *ex post facto* judgment. Frederick D. E. Schleiermacher, the great critic and Aristotelian scholar, born one hundred and seventy years after Spenser's death, held that the *Magna Moralia* was the source of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and of the *Eudemean Ethics*.² Only recently have scholars begun to agree that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is probably the most truly Aristotelian of the three. An uncritical scholar like Spenser would certainly have made no such distinction. He would simply have accepted all three as the teachings of Aristotle, as they really are.

There is ample warrant in Aristotle for the idea that one of the moral virtues may be thought of as containing all the others. For example, it is clear from the *Nicomachean Ethics* that Magnanimity (I have elsewhere used the term Highmindedness) would fill this requirement;³ for although Magnanimity, or Highmindedness, is essentially love of great honor, it includes moral perfection in the fullest sense. Again, on the same authority Justice, in the broad sense, includes all the moral virtues so far as one's relations to others are concerned. But under Spenser's plan, set forth in the letter to Raleigh, the virtue assigned to Arthur could have no Book; and Spenser was too much interested in church matters and in politics not to write on Holiness and Justice. Besides, there would be a kind of impropriety in omitting the former; probably the Scripture text "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you" had something to do, not only with Spenser's writing on Holiness, but also with his treating it

¹ *Mod. Phil.*, III, 374.

² *The Works of Aristotle, Translated into English under the Editorship of W. D. Ross: Magna Moralia, Ethica Eudemia, De Virtutibus et Vitiis* (Oxford, 1915), Intro., p. v.

³ *N. Eth.*, IV, vii, and II, vii.

first. It was highly desirable then to reserve Highmindedness, or Magnanimity, and Justice for what we know as the First and Fifth Books. (If, as Jusserand holds, Spenser had already written the Book on Holiness when he completed the plan set forth in his letter to Raleigh, it was absolutely necessary to leave Highmindedness, Magnanimity, as the virtue of the Knight of Holiness; for it would do admirably for him, and no other virtue would do.) Thus if Spenser could assign some other virtue to Arthur, he could make the plan of his poem more elastic.

Now there was another virtue which was peculiarly adapted to Arthur, provided it could be made to include all the virtues—namely, Magnificence. According to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "Magnificence is suitable to . . . persons of rank and reputation and the like, as all these advantages confer importance and dignity."¹ Rank? Arthur's was the highest. Reputation? Spenser tells us in the letter to Raleigh that it was because of Arthur's reputation that he chose him as the hero of the *Faerie Queene*, he "being made famous by many men's former works." Again, the magnificent man labors for the public good and strives for honor. Once more, "The motive of the magnificent man in incurring expense will be nobleness; for nobleness is a characteristic of all the virtues." "In a word, Magnificence is excellence of work on a great scale."² What could better describe Arthur's great works?

But can Magnificence be made to include all the virtues? Although in a strict sense it is simply a mean between meanness and vulgar display in the use of money, it seems to include much more. Moreover, there is, as we have already seen, abundant authority in the *Nicomachean Ethics* for taking the virtues not only in a strict but also in a broad or metaphorical sense. If Magnificence were similarly interpreted, it would be "the perfection of all the rest and contain in it them all." But all this is from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. What do Aristotle's other works on morals say about Magnificence? The *Magna Moralia* says: "But there are, as people think, more kinds of Magnificence than one; for instance, people say, 'His walk was Magnificent,' and there are of course other uses of the term

¹ IV, iv; II, vii.

² Cf. Aristotle's discussion of the magnificent man, *N. Eth.*, IV, iv-v.

Magnificent in a metaphorical, not in a strict, sense."¹ This is certainly suggestive. And according to the *Ethica Eudemia*, "The magnificent man is not concerned with any and every action or choice, but with expenditure—unless we use the term metaphorically."² Here is a plain suggestion that Magnificence could be taken in a broad sense, could be made to include "any and every action or choice." Such is Magnificence "according to Aristotle." Who "the rest" are is not quite clear, but Spenser's favorite poet, Chaucer, says in his *Persones Tale*, "Thanne comth Magnificence, that is to seyn, whan a man dooth and perfourneth grete werkes of goodnesse"³—exactly what Arthur "dooth."

We come now to Jusserand's third and last main argument. Jusserand contends that Spenser did not get his virtues from Aristotle and proceeds to argue that he did get them from his friend Lodowick Bryskett, and from Piccolomini's *Istitutione morale*, through Bryskett. He thus finds it necessary to get over Spenser's own assertion that he did take his virtues from Aristotle. He argues that "Spenser showed as a rule no minute accuracy in his indications of sources and models, and he did not display more than usual in this particular case."⁴ The first part of the proposition is true. But to find that "as a rule" Spenser showed no "minute accuracy" is a vastly different thing from concluding that a solemn statement concerning the substance of his whole *Faerie Queene* is "misleading, every word of it."

Let us examine Jusserand's argument⁵ that Spenser derived his virtues from Bryskett, and from Piccolomini through Bryskett. Long after Spenser's death Bryskett published *A Discourse of Civil Life*,⁶ a translation from Giraldo Cinthio's three dialogues *Dell' allevare et ammaestrare i figliuoli nella vita civile*. It is an account of the best way to rear children and includes a discussion of moral virtues in which the number twelve is mentioned. That Spenser knew this *Discourse* Jusserand concludes from the fact that Bryskett represents Spenser as one of the interlocutors in the conversation which furnishes the machinery of the book. Before the day of Spenser and Bryskett,

¹ I, xxvi.

² III, vi.

³ 736 (§ 61).

⁴ *Mod. Phil.*, III, 374.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 378-80.

⁶ London, 1606.

Piccolomini, taking Aristotle and Plato as his masters, had written his *Istitutione morale*, in which he discussed eleven moral virtues and added the statement that Prudence, which he classed as an intellectual virtue, might be considered a moral virtue. Jusserand holds that "twelve was a kind of sacred number and was sure to come in." In his *Discourse* Bryskett states that when he came to the question of the moral virtues he found that Cinthio had treated them "somewhat too briefly and confusedly" and adds, "I have therefore, to help mine own understanding, had recourse to Piccolomini."¹ Jusserand takes this statement as "positive testimony" that Spenser knew the substance of the *Istitutione morale*. Jusserand concludes: "From such books and such *conversations*, from other less solemn *talks* which he and Bryskett, interested in the same problems, could not fail to have, Spenser derived his *list of virtues* and his *ideas regarding a list of twelve*."

Now it is quite possible that Spenser, the genius, should get his ideas from Lodowick Bryskett, a man of no great parts. It is also possible, however improbable, that Spenser read Bryskett's book twenty years before it was published. But there is no proof, or even evidence, that such was the case. And, by the same token, there is no evidence that Spenser knew Piccolomini's *Istitutione*. Professor Erskine has proved, what most careful students must already have suspected, that Bryskett's "conversation" which furnishes Jusserand's "positive testimony" is a myth. In putting his discussion into the form of a dialogue in which he himself, Spenser, the Bishop of Armagh, and others are the speakers, Bryskett is simply following a literary convention of the day. It is impossible to suppose all the characters of the dialogue actually together at Bryskett's cottage.² Besides, Erskine finds that the speeches which Bryskett puts into the mouths of Spenser and the good Bishop of Armagh are translated straight from Giraldi Cinthio. He finds further that even if the dialogue had been a real one it could have had little to do with Piccolomini, for it contains only one passage from him. It may be added that Bryskett could have taken the idea for the machinery of his *Discourse* from Spenser's *Mother Hubberds Tale*. In both cases

¹ *Med. Phil.*, III, 378-80.

² *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, XXIII, 831-50.

the author is sick, his friends come in to see him, and the conversation which is later given to the reader takes place. The only difference is that Bryskett is so anxious to take the credit of authorship that he commits the absurdity of having the sick man, Bryskett himself, do the talking, which consists in lecturing on philosophy for three days.

In the next place, even if Spenser had known Bryskett's *Discourse*, he could not have taken his virtues and the plan of his *Faerie Queene* from it. For one reason, Spenser's and Bryskett's virtues are unlike in nature. For example, Bryskett, like Plato, makes Prudence one of the moral virtues, whereas Spenser, as we have already seen, follows Aristotle in making it that intellectual virtue which determines the mean in the case of each of the moral virtues. Again, Bryskett makes Magnanimity a subordinate virtue, whereas Spenser, like Aristotle, makes it include all the moral virtues. Moreover, Spenser's basis of classification is quite different from Bryskett's. In Bryskett's classification, to quote his own words, "There are . . . four principall vertues . . . from which four are also derived (as branches from their trees) sundry others to make up the number twelve,"¹ whereas Spenser, like Aristotle, makes one of his virtues include all the others. Finally, even the agreement in point of number, which Jusserand would make much of, does not exist. Bryskett's number is twelve, Spenser's thirteen. And Spenser's plan of his poem, set forth in the letter to Raleigh, would have been impossible with any other number of virtues than thirteen. Thus it is plain that Spenser did not get his virtues from Bryskett.

WILLIAM FENN DEMOSS

NEBRASKA WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

¹ Quoted by Jusserand, *Mod. Phil.*, III, 380.

A NEW DATE FOR THE CONQUEST OF GRANADA

Scholars have made many surmises regarding the dates of the first performances of the two parts of Dryden's *Conquest of Granada*. The delimiting dates within which the two parts appeared are generally recognized as 1669—the year of production for *Tyrannic Love*—and February, 1670–71, when the *Conquest of Granada* was entered on the Stationers' books. Within these limits conjecture has been various, with a tendency to date the complete production early in the dramatic season of 1669–70.

A contemporary letter¹ now appears as proof that the second part was produced early in January, 1671. This letter, written by Lady Mary Bertie to her niece Katherine Noel, then at Exton, reads as follows:

1670[–71], January 2. Westminster—I have noe news to send you but that my brother Norreyss Act is passed both Houses, and I hope now it will not bee long beefore I see you at Exton. There is letely come out a new play writ by Mr. Dreyden who made the *Indian Emperor*. It is caled the *Conquest of Grenada*. My brother Norreys tooke a box and carryed my Lady Rochester and his mistresse and all us to[o], and on Tuestay wee are to goe see the second part of it which is then the first tim acted. I am suere you would bee with us if wishes could bring you. My sister Osborine and all heare are well and all my brothers. Here was the Duke of Buckingham and a greate deale of company dind here to-day.

From this statement it is clear that the latest date intended for the staging of Part II would be January 9, 1671. As to Part I, only conjecture seems possible; yet since in Lady Bertie's last previous letter, dated December 10, 1670, no mention was made of the play, it probably appeared between that date and the close of the year, possibly during the Christmas festivities. Genest's argument is to the point here; he wrote,² "They who had seen the 1st part, would naturally be inclined to see the 2nd—and they who had not seen the 1st, would not easily understand the 2nd." The dates may fairly be set as between December 20, 1670, and January 9, 1671.

¹ *Hist. MSS. Com.*, XII, App. 5, p. 22.

² *Some Account of the English Stage*, etc., I, 101.

This new fact clears up Dryden's meaning in the Epilogue of Part I, where he asks his audience to

Think him not duller for this year's delay;

he is obviously begging pardon for postponing the presentation of the *Conquest of Granada*, and the reason is not far to seek. Dryden asserts that the men were ready, but the women ill; then he adds:

And pity us, your servants, to whose cost,
In one such sickness, nine whole months are lost.

Here the allusion is to Nell Gwyn, mistress of Charles II, who gave birth to Charles Beauclerk on May 8, 1670. This evident explanation suits the facts far better than the view that "this year's delay" goes back to the staging of *Tyrannic Love*, in 1669, and that thus Part I was presented early in 1670.

Critics have already thrown doubt upon the tradition that Nell Gwyn won the king by her rendition of the Prologue of the *Conquest of Granada*, Part I. Inasmuch as she did not speak it until several months after the birth of her son, it is more credible that Charles II was led on by hearing her in *Tyrannic Love*. This is the assertion of the publisher Curll.

The letter, however, has its most important interest for the student of Buckingham's *Rehearsal*, first presented on December 7, 1671. Since the Duke was in Westminster in January, 1671, he was more than likely present at the first performance of Part II. In such case he would have ample chance after seeing this play to rework the unfinished stage satire of his *Rehearsal* before the next dramatic season. With an interval of less than a year between the two plays, instead of two years according to former computations, the *Rehearsal* was making satiric hits at lines and situations still fresh in the minds of London audiences.

LEONARD DELONG WALLACE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

A Woman Killed with Kindness and The Fair Maid of the West.

By THOMAS HEYWOOD. Edited by KATHARINE LEE BATES.
(The Belles-Lettres Series.) Boston, New York, and Chicago:
D. C. Heath & Co., 1917. 12mo, pp. cxiv+300.

In the Introduction to her edition of Thomas Heywood's *A Woman Killed with Kindness* and *The Fair Maid of the West*, Miss Bates devotes her attention almost solely to biographical and bibliographical matters. This is a happy departure from the accepted custom of the Belles-Lettres Series, for Heywood stands greatly in need of just such a study, and his editor could not have rendered students of the drama a better service. In more than one hundred closely printed pages she records all that at present is known of Heywood's life, and discusses in some detail all of his works, both dramatic and non-dramatic. For this full summary, executed with scholarly care, students of Heywood will be sincerely grateful.

Two of the additions which Miss Bates has been able to make to the slender biography of the poet deserve special mention. In the parish registers of St. James, Clerkenwell, she discovered the entry of Heywood's death in 1641, thus disposing of the notion that he lived on well through the period of the Commonwealth. And in the Probate Registry of Somerset House she found the will of Heywood's beloved uncle, Edmund, "that good old man" who probably inspired most of the hospitable and noble-minded personages in the plays. The will, which is pleasant reading, not only records a bequest to "Thomas Heywoode and his wief," but in a most intimate way brings us into the circle of the poet's own family.

Of the biographical material discovered by other scholars Miss Bates has missed very little. She seems, however, not to be aware of the lawsuit which in 1623 Gervase Markham brought against Heywood and thirty-eight other defendants, mostly actors. The documents in the case were printed by Mr. Wallace in the *Shakespeare Jahrbuch*, XLVI, 345. In these the place of Heywood's residence is several times given with legal precision as "neare Clarkenwell Hill, in the Parish of St. James." Here he seems to have lived for many years, and from this parish he was buried in 1641.

In her discussion of the various plays that have been assigned to Heywood by modern scholars Miss Bates shows a sound judgment issuing from an intimate knowledge of the dramatist's mental and stylistic qualities. She says: "Mr. Bullen's tentative ascription to Heywood of *Dick of Devonshire* may be set aside, as well as the suggestion that Heywood was part author of

Pericles"; and of Mr. Sieveking's attribution to him of *Worke for Cullers* she remarks: "Subject, manner, phrasing, all are against this." To the same conclusions, if I may be allowed to say so, I came independently after a long and careful study of these plays for the sole purpose of detecting the hand of Heywood. Of *The Merry Devil of Edmonton* Miss Bates thinks that "touches of the Heywood vocabulary are in evidence, as well as the Heywood flavor." This too accords with the result of my own detailed examination of that play. Heywood, however, cannot be thought of as the chief author of *The Merry Devil*; the unmistakable hand of Thomas Dekker is to be found in most of the scenes. After stating that "strong cases have been made out for *How a Man May Choose a Good Wife from a Bad*, *A Warning for Fair Women*, *Appius and Virginia*, and scenes of *Sir Thomas Stukeley*," she designates *The Isle of Dogs* as "more doubtful." This is unfortunate, for the authorship and history of that interesting play are now fully known. See E. K. Chambers, *Modern Language Review*, IV, 407, 511; R. B. McKerrow, *The Works of Thomas Nashe*, V, 29; C. W. Wallace, *Englische Studien*, XLIII, 340; and Adams, *Shakespearean Playhouses*, p. 170.

The detailed record of Heywood's many non-dramatic works is not the least valuable section of the Introduction. Deserving of special notice is the discovery in the British Museum of one of his broadsides, "Three Wonders of This Age," hitherto unknown; and the very plausible identification of his "booke called Mistakes, Clinches, Tales, &c." (which John Okes entered in the Stationers' Registers on November 18, 1636), with *A New Book of Mistakes, or Bulls with Tales, and Bulls without Tales, But no lyes by any means*, published by Nicholas Okes (the father of John) in 1637. This pleasant little collection of jests has sometimes been assigned to Robert Chamberlain, but apparently for no good reason. In discussing Heywood's "Epistle," printed at the end of *An Apology for Actors*, Miss Bates says: "It is not evident what it is that Shakespeare, 'to do himselfe right,' had 'since published . . . in his owne name.'" The language of the "Epistle," though awkward, is perfectly clear. The public might suppose that Heywood, in his *Britain's Troy*, had stolen two poems from Shakespeare, and that shortly afterward Shakespeare, "to do himselfe right," had claimed these poems by inserting them in the third edition of *The Passionate Pilgrim*. Since the whole passage is significant in its bearing on Shakespeare, a clear interpretation is imperative.

The text of *A Woman Killed with Kindness* is reproduced from a copy of the second (and best) quarto, 1617, owned by Professor George P. Baker, of Harvard; and the text of *The Fair Maid of the West* is reproduced from a copy of the first (and only) quarto, 1631, in the Barton Collection of the Boston Public Library. So far as one can judge, these texts are reproduced with the proper care, and the more significant variant readings in other editions both ancient and modern have been recorded in footnotes. But one

may complain that no attempt has been made in either case to collate the particular Boston copy selected for reproduction with other copies of the same edition. It would have been desirable to collate these copies with the copies in the British Museum, or in the Bodleian Library, or with both. The value of collating two or more copies of an early edition is well known, and the need in the case of at least one of these plays seems to be clear. For example, Collier, in his edition of *The Fair Maid of the West*, states that in the particular copy he reproduces there is no heading prefixed to the list of persons, yet Miss Bates finds in the Barton copy the heading "Dramatis Personae," and the possibility of other variant readings is at least suggested by her notes on Collier's text.

The absence of a discussion of the dates of composition for the two plays is possibly due to the fact that the Introduction concerns itself with a general study of Heywood. Miss Bates, however, assumes that the date of composition for *The Fair Maid of the West* coincides with the date of publication (see, for example, the note to p. 169, l. 58); but most scholars, with good reason, I think, favor a date nearer to 1604. The question is too important to be thus ignored.

Probably for the same reason no attempt has been made to sketch the history of the plays subsequent to their publication. Yet this is both interesting and important for a full appreciation of the plays, and room for it might have been found somewhere. The history of *The Fair Maid of the West* has been traced by Professor Ross Jewell in *Studies in English Drama*, edited by Allison Gaw, 1917. The history of *A Woman Killed with Kindness* is probably even more interesting. The play was reworked by Victor as *The Fatal Error*, printed in the second volume of his *Miscellanies*, 1776. It has also been several times revived with notable success, for example, in London in 1887 and in New York in 1914.

The Notes are scholarly throughout, and judiciously chosen, though of course one might here and there add a comment. Thus, in the address "To the Reader," prefixed to *The Fair Maid of the West*, Heywood says: "Curteous Reader, my plaies have not beene exposed to the publike view of the world in numerous sheets and a large volume." The allusion is to the publication of Jonson's plays with the title *Workes*. Heywood makes the same complaint in his address "To the Reader," prefixed to *The English Traveller*, 1633: "True it is, that my Playes are not exposed vnto the world in Volumes, to beare the titles of Workes (as others)." Nor was Heywood the only one to gibe at Ben's vanity. From among numerous such passages I may quote two. John Suckling, in "A Session of the Poets," writes:

The first that broke Silence was good old Ben,
Prepar'd before with Canary Wine;
And he told them plainly he deserved the Bayes,
For his were call'd Works, where others were but Plays.

And the author of *Wits Recreations* writes:

Pray tell me, Ben, where doth the mystery lurk,
What others call a play, you call a work.

But, of course, of the making of notes there is no end.

The Bibliography is in two sections, of which the first, labeled "Texts," records all the editions of the two plays. We notice the omission of Professor Neilson's reprint of *A Woman Killed with Kindness* in *The Chief Elizabethan Dramatists*, 1911. The second section, labeled "Biographical and Critical Works," constitutes an invaluable general bibliography of Heywood. A special feature is the inclusion of every known allusion to Heywood before the end of the seventeenth century.

The following items should be added:

1633. *Histrio-Mastix*. William Prynne. [Add "A reference to Heywood, p. 722."]

1636. *Annalia Dubrensis*. [There was also a reprint by E. R. Vyvyan in 1878.]

1832. *Some Account of the English Stage from the Restoration in 1660 to 1830*. John Genest. Bath. [Contains accounts of revivals of Heywood's plays.]

1880. "Documents Relating to the Players at the Red Bull, Clerkenwell, and the Cockpit in Drury Lane, in the Time of James I." J. Greenstreet. [In *The New Shakspeare Society Transactions* (1880-86), p. 489. Also in the *Athenæum*, February 21, 1885; and in F. G. Fleay's *A Chronicle History of the London Stage*, 1890.]

1887. "Thomas Heywood, Dramatist." Lionel G. Cresswell. *Book-Lore*, VI, 7.

1896-1904. *Histoire littéraire du peuple anglais*. J. J. Jusserand. Paris.

1904. *Die Italienische Novelle im Englischen Drama von 1600 bis zur Restauration*. Adèle Ott. Zurich. [Discusses the source of *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, and other plays by Heywood.]

1909. *Geschichte des neueren Dramas*. W. Creizenach. Halle. [An English translation by Cécile Hugon, London, 1916.]

1909. *Elizabethan Drama. Notes and Studies*. J. LeGay Brereton. Sydney. [Notes on the texts of Thomas Heywood, pp. 128-41.]

1910. "Gervase Markham, Dramatist." C. W. Wallace. *The Shakespeare Jahrbuch*, XLVI, 345. [Documents relating to a lawsuit in which Heywood is one of the defendants.]

1913. *Englands Parnassus*. Edited by Charles Crawford. Oxford. [Important notes on Heywood, pp. xxxi, 509, 529.]

1917. "Heywood's *Fair Maid of the West*." Ross Jewell. [In *Studies in English Drama* (edited by Allison Gaw, New York), p. 62. This study appeared after Miss Bates's work had gone to the press.]

Let us hope that before long students of the Tudor-Stuart drama will be provided with a complete and definitive edition of the plays of our "prose Shakespeare." Toward the production of such an edition Miss Bates's admirable study will contribute much.

JOSEPH QUINCY ADAMS

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

A Literary Middle English Reader. Edited by ALBERT S. COOK.
Boston: Ginn & Co., 1915. Pp. xxviii+554.

As frankly avowed by the title, this Middle English reader differs from all its predecessors in proposing to furnish a body of texts, not for linguistic, but for literary, study. The object of the editor is to make accessible and intelligible a diversified group of poetical or prose works of each of the chief types of mediaeval vernacular English literature: romances, tales, chronicles, stories of travel, religious and didactic pieces, illustrations of life and manners, translations, lyrics, and plays. The material is classified under these headings, and even under each heading it is not arranged according to dialect or chronology.

In order to reduce to a minimum the apparatus which must intervene between student and text, the linguistic information is reduced to eight pages on pronunciation, inflection, and dialects. There are no linguistic notes, and there is no separate glossary, but the difficult words or forms are defined in footnotes, with a reference number from word to note. The texts on the whole are emended conservatively, and the manuscript readings are given in footnotes. At the head of each selection is the essential information about date, manuscripts, and editions; frequently a statement of problems or discussions; a summary of the whole work (if only an extract is printed); and some characterization of the literary value of the selection. On pages xxvi-xxviii is printed a short but admirably selected list of "Useful Books for the Study of Middle English."

Probably there are no two persons familiar with Middle English literature who would agree on the choice of material for such a volume; and in any event neither adverse criticism nor positive suggestion could now alter the contents. On the whole, the selections give an adequate idea of the kinds of people in England to whom literature in English appealed between 1200 and 1500; a fair view of the diverse forms that that literature assumed; and some knowledge of the skill, and of the lack of it, exhibited by English poets and prose-writers of that period. Chaucer is drawn on rather heavily; Gower is represented; extracts are given from *Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight*, from the *Pearl*, and from *Piers the Plowman*; five plays are printed entire. The book gives us a body of fresh and unhackneyed material, duplicating next to nothing of the contents of other books of the same

character. Whatever of striking literary importance is not included (for example, *The Debate between the Body and the Soul*) is accessible in other generally used readers, such as Emerson, or Morris and Skeat.

The editor's effort briefly to characterize mediaeval vernacular literature is not especially felicitous, particularly the analogy with Gothic architecture. In the case of Middle English literature two considerations should be emphasized. First, before the year 1300 practically all the persons in England who read (or listened to) learned or polite literature demanded literature in Latin or in French. Two consequences ensued: most of the vernacular literature that existed probably was of a low standard, appealing, as it did, only to the uncultivated classes; and very little vernacular literature got written down, for parchment, vellum, and scribal labor were fairly expensive, putting the product beyond the reach of the "vernacular public." Since there was no market for manuscripts in the vernacular, few such manuscripts were produced. Therefore few of the works in English that did exist before 1300 have been preserved.

Second, in the case of that Middle English literature that has survived from both the early and the late periods, we do not confine our study to the best or to the pure literature, but we have overgenerously applied the term "literature" to practically every extant document written within the period in the English language. Some of these works are not "literature" at all. They were produced through a period of three hundred years, for all sorts of purposes and publics, with constantly changing technique, by writers who exhibited skill and power in varying degrees.

It would of course be absurd to imply that the technique of dramatic and narrative forms, for example, has not changed greatly since 1500. But any attempt to characterize such changes briefly, as well as any attempt to describe briefly the other and greater differences between mediaeval and modern literature as a whole, is in the nature of the case utterly impossible.

There are a few glosses in the book that might be improved: *þin erende to bede* (13. 10) = "to announce thy message;" *also* (16. 3) = "thus;" *anonder* (16. 27) = "one under;" *were* (17. 1) = "wear;" *let* (19. 15) = "left;" *everi del* (26. 25) = "every bit," i.e., every bit of their talk was about Havelok; *red* (31. 15) = "help;" *unkyndelike* (33. 4) = "unnaturally;" *al so, al so* (33. 7) = "as, as;" *let* (39.4) = "caused (to);" *for the nones* (47. 22) = "expressly" (see Hinckley, *Notes on Chaucer*, p. 28); *lak* (199. 10) = "fault," "blame."

Some emendations are unnecessary: *MS with* (24. 19) = *wiht*, "strong;" *MS was werse* (27. 25) needs no transposition; *[and]* (30. 15) is not required.

The best text in print has not always been followed. The extracts from the "Bestiary" are based on Mätzner, *Altenglische Sprachproben*, though

Morris has a more recent and much more accurate print of the manuscript in the *Old English Miscellany* (E.E.T.S., 49). An inspection of the latter would have enabled the editor to avoid the errors in footnotes 12, 13, 19, p. 318; 16, p. 319; 21, p. 320.

THOMAS A. KNOTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit; Euphues & his England. By JOHN LYLY. Edited by MORRIS W. CROLL and HARRY CLEMONS. London: George Routledge & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916. Pp. lxiv+473.

Professor Croll in his new edition of *Euphues*—with a modernized text prepared largely by Mr. Clemons—succeeds through the introduction and notes in throwing fresh light on this much-studied pioneer work of the English Renaissance. In the notes many new sources and influences, especially of English proverbial lore, are traced for particular passages. In the introduction adequate attention is for the first time called to the influence exerted on the Euphuistic type of style by mediaeval rhetoric with its *schemata*, and thus an excellent corrective is furnished to previous studies, which have recently focused attention too exclusively on the contribution of humanism to Euphuism. Such a treatment lays the basis for a better understanding of the fact that Lyly, like Spenser, contributed to the outburst of creative literature in England by aiding in the amalgamation of mediaeval culture with the newly revived classical culture, and particularly by following in the wake of Italy, where already the amalgamation had produced a literature in harmony with the social life of the period. I have urged elsewhere that Lyly's plays show a modification of court-of-love allegory by Platonism and of mediaeval pageantry by a new romantic classicism, and that even the didactic *Anatomy of Wit* is typical of the combined influences at work in the writings of Lyly (*Mod. Lang. Notes*, XXVII, 147-52; *Mod. Phil.*, XIV, 483-84). Professor Croll here emphasizes sufficiently the mediaevalism in the style of *Euphues*. But his emphasis of this tends to obscure the fact that the mediaeval tradition was practically absorbed in the new humanism. In drawing an unwarrantably sharp distinction between mediaeval and humanistic ideals of rhetoric, he neglects to point out how often a leading humanist like Erasmus overemphasizes rhetoric and recommends the more famous mediaeval rhetorics for study. In stressing the hostility of the humanists to the *schemata*, he does not trace the various degrees of purism among the men influenced by the New Learning or point out that his best exemplar, Wilson, belonged to a group of admirers of the simplicity of Demosthenes' style. In citing Ascham, another of this group, Professor

Croll has to admit that in certain types of work Ascham uses an ornate style; but even then he fails to realize that, guided by the contemporary laws of decorum, one must seek the immediate models for the style of Lyly's social romance in the non-didactic literature of the age. His mistake arises from accepting with Feuillerat *The Anatomy of Wit* as belonging, on account of its didacticism, with the works of Ascham and others of the puristic school, though he correctly traces the kinship of Lyly's style to that of other courtly writers (Puttenham furnishes an excellent uncited example of the long hold of mediaeval rhetoric on the court group). Professor Croll's conception of the nature of *The Anatomy* also leads him to overemphasize the influence of Ascham on the educational ideals of Lyly without showing how near Lyly is to the ideals of the Italian courtesy books in his treatment of social life, wit, etc. To Ascham he traces also the "bourgeois" spirit of *Euphues*, but he neglects the general humanistic conception of "gentility" most often discussed by the courtesy books. A somewhat similar lack of perspective seems to me to be shown in the emphasis on proverbs, which, like the maxims of "Cato" and similes from bestiaries, are simply one form of "amplification" by "precept and example" and an even less significant one than examples from Pliny's natural history or classical "sentences" and illustrations.

C. R. BASKERVILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

